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ABSTRACT
  Gender diversity in corporate governance is a highly debated 
issue worldwide.  National campaigns such as “2020 Women on 
Boards” in the United States and “Women on the Board Pledge 
for Europe” are examples of just two initiatives aimed at increas-
ing female representation in the corporate boardroom. Several 
European countries have adopted board quotas as a means to-
ward achieving gender diversity. Japan has passed an Act on 
Promotion of Women’s Participation and Advancement in the 
Workplace to lay a foundation for establishing targets for pro-
moting women. 
  This Article examines the status of women in positions of 
leadership in the United States, several major countries in the 
European Union, and Japan.  We focus on the legal backdrop in 
each jurisdiction regarding gender discrimination and studies 
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tending to demonstrate the economic benefits of gender diversity. 
We conclude that although important steps have been taken in 
the direction of narrowing the gender gap in all jurisdictions ex-
amined, progress has been slow and difficult across the board.  
The issue of too few women at the top will not be resolved until 
there is a wider acceptance that female leaders can benefit their 
organizations and contribute to social and economic progress.  
Moreover, the presence of women on corporate boards is valuable 
in and of itself and the status quo ought to be further challenged 
in international business.  
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Introduction 
Gender diversity on corporate boards is a highly debated issue 
worldwide. In addition to providing equal opportunity, promoting 
equality and inclusion of women in positions of leadership is believed to 
have positive effects on the financial performance of a company. Na-
tional campaigns such as “2020 Women on Boards” in the U.S.1 or 
“Women on the Board Pledge for Europe” in the E.U.2 are just two ex-
amples of initiatives that aim to increase female representation in board-
rooms. Rising female representation on boards has been identified as a 
trend for 2020,3 while board configuration is considered to be a “strate-
gic resource of the organization.”4 The European Commission has 
stressed the economic importance of gender diversity on corporate 
boards, quoting several studies showing correlations between women’s 
presence on boards and various improved financial metrics.5 Japan’s Act 
on Promotion of Women’s Participation and Advancement in the 
Workplace, enacted in 2016, lays a foundation for establishing targets 
for promoting women to decision-making positions.6 Furthermore, we 
agree with those who argue that the status quo ought to be challenged in 
international business, both in terms of economic importance and for 
considerations of equal opportunity and fairness.7
This Article compares gender issues in corporate leadership among 
the United States, a sampling of countries in the European Union, and 
Japan. There are multiple reasons for this selection of jurisdictions for 
our comparative analysis. First, all three jurisdictions reflect highly de-
veloped industrial powers with well-established corporate cultures. Sec-
 1. 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, GENDER DIVERSITY INDEX 2 (2018), https://www.
2020wob.com/sites/default/files/2020WOB_GDI_Report_2018_FINAL.pdf. 
 2. European Commission Memoranda/11/124, EU Justice Commissioner Reding Chal-
lenges Business Leaders to Increase Women’s Presence on Corporate Boards with 
“Women on the Board Pledge for Europe” (March 1, 2011). 
 3. Pedro Nuendo, 10 Trends for the Board of 2020, 29 IESE INSIGHT 45, 47 – 48 
(2016).
 4. CB. Ingley & N.T. van der Walt, Board Configuration: Building Better Boards, 3 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5, 5 (2003).  
 5. Progress Report on Women in Economic Decision-Making in the EU, at 7 (2012), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/women-on-boards_en.pdf.
 6. Act on Promotion of Women’s Participation and Advancement in the Workplace, 
Act No. 64 of September 4, 2015, (Japan), translated in An Act on Promotion of 
Women’s Participation and Advancement in the Workplace (Tentative Translation),
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail_main?re=02&vm=02&id=3018. 
 7. See Patrizia Zanoni et al., Editorial, Unpacking Diversity, Grasping Inequality: Re-
thinking Difference Through Critical Perspectives, 17(1) ORGANIZATION 9, 9 – 11, 20 
(2012).
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ond, each jurisdiction has a noteworthy history of tackling the problems 
of gender equality and a more or less established recognition of women’s 
potential to contribute to the economic and social development of their 
countries. Finally, despite the industrial progress of these jurisdictions, 
none of them can boast of creating a sufficiently supportive environ-
ment for women to rise to positions of leadership.  
We begin in Section I with an examination of the status of women 
in positions of leadership in the United States, various countries in the 
European Union, and Japan. Section II continues with analysis of the 
legal backdrop regarding gender discrimination and efforts to eradicate 
it. In Section III, we offer some proposals for reform. Concluding 
remarks follow. 
I. Women in Positions of Leadership 
This Section examines the status of women in positions of leader-
ship in the United States, various countries in the European Union, and 
Japan. As discussed below, although opportunities for women to ad-
vance in firms have risen in all these jurisdictions in recent years, the en-
vironment for women aspiring to positions of leadership leaves much to 
be desired. 
A. The United States 
The United States has historically seen low female representation in 
corporate leadership roles. Although female gains have been accelerating 
in recent years,8 women remain underrepresented on corporate boards. 
Greater progress has been made, however, regarding managerial and 
other leadership positions: a slight majority of all American manage-
ment and professional positions are held by women,9 but this is not 
without caveats, which are discussed below. This Section examines the 
history and current status of women on boards and in management in 
the United States, including current statistics, trends, and a review of 
proposed causes of disparities. 
 8. 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, supra note 1. 
 9. John Baker & Joseph Canegmi, Why Are There So Few Women CEOs and Senior 
Leaders in Corporate America?, ORGANIZATIONAL DEV. J., 2016, at 31, 33. 
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1. Women on Corporate Boards 
Although women served on American corporate boards as early as 
1900,10 they still remain a small minority. As of 2017, women held 24.4 
percent of board seats within Fortune 100 firms, and just over 20 per-
cent across the Fortune 1000.11 Seven percent of firms in the Fortune 
1000 had no female board members.12 Progress has been rapid—
between 2011 and 2017, the proportion of firms with at least 20 per-
cent female board members rose from 29 percent to well over half—but 
gender parity is still a long way off. 13 Importantly, the increase in female 
membership on American corporate boards is often the result of adding 
new board seats rather than existing members being replaced,14 raising 
concerns that women may simply be added to boards as tokens.15 Effec-
tively, growth in female representation may be somewhat artificial if 
preexisting board seats remain male. 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office estimates that it could 
take four decades for parity to be reached if present trends continue,16
with smaller firms especially lagging behind. The boards of the 500 
smallest firms within the Fortune 1000 have six percent fewer women 
than the Fortune 100, at only 18.8 percent versus 24.4 percent.17 Six 
percent of firms in the Russell 1000, another index of American firms, 
have all-male boards, a number that grows to 21 percent among the 
Russell 3000, illustrating the greater lack of board diversity among 
smaller firms.18
There are also significant disparities in board gender diversity 
across industries. Among the Fortune 1000, real estate firms have the 
highest average proportion of women on boards, at 23.1 percent, com-
pared to only 14 percent on energy industry boards.19 The technology 
sector has received special attention for its lack of gender diversity: 
 10. Phyllis King, Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards: Spotlighting Wisconsin, 32 WIS. J.
L. GENDER, & SOC’Y 1, 7 (2017).  
 11. 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, supra note 1. 
12. Id.
13. Id. 
 14. Id.
 15. See, e.g., Jan Luca Pletzer et al., Does Gender Matter? Female Representation on Corpo-
rate Boards and Firm Financial Performance - A Meta-Analysis, 10 PLOS ONE 1, 4 
(2015).
16. Id.
17. Id.
 18. See Brianna Castro, Raising the Stakes on Board Gender Diversity, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., 1, 2 (2019). 
 19. 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, supra note 1. 
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among the SV 150, an index of major Silicon Valley firms, 80 percent 
have one or zero female board members, compared to 18 percent among 
S&P 500 firms.20 The disparities suggest that solutions might need to be 
tailored to specific industries. 
2. Women in Management 
Compared with corporate boards, management has historically 
seen more equal representation, with women holding nearly 40 percent 
of all managerial roles in the U.S. in 2018,21 a figure largely unchanged 
since 2015.22 Women also have taken up the bulk of new management 
positions: of 4.5 million new management jobs created between 1980 
and 2010, women took 2.6 million, or about 58 percent.23 The propor-
tion of women falls, however, as one moves further up the managerial 
ladder: among S&P 500 companies, women make up 44.7 percent of 
the total workforce, 36.9 percent of line managers, 26.5 percent of sen-
ior level managers, and only five percent of CEOs.24 Women are so un-
derrepresented in the executive suite that just six female CEOs leaving 
their firms in 2018 caused the total number of female CEOs among 
Fortune 500 companies to drop by 25 percent.25 In North America, the 
year 2018 saw a drop in the proportion of senior roles being held by 
women (down to 21 percent from 23 percent),26 although the propor-
tion of businesses with at least one woman in senior management did 
jump from 69 percent to 81 percent over the same one-year period.27
Female managers were also most common in certain “female-
 20. FENWICK & WEST LLP, GENDER DIVERSITY IN SILICON VALLEY 9 (2014), 
https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/Gender_Diversity_2014.pdf. 
 21. Women in Management: Quick Take, CATALYST RESEARCH (2019), https://www.
catalyst.org/research/women-in-management/. 
 22. 39 Percent of Managers in 2015 Were Women, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS:
TED: THE ECONOMICS DAILY (August 1, 2016), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/
2016/39-percent-of-managers-in-2015-were-women.htm. 
 23. William Scarborough, What the Data Says About Women in Management Between 
1980 and 2010, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 23, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/02/what-
the-data-says-about-women-in-management-between-1980-and-2010. 
 24. Women in Management, supra note 21.  
 25. Emily Stewart, Women Are Running for Office in Record Numbers. In Corporate Ameri-
ca, They’re Losing Ground., VOX (June 8, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2018/6/8/17413254/women-fortune-500-ceos-politics-blue-wave. 
 26. GRANT THORNTON, WOMEN IN BUSINESS: BEYOND POLICY TO PROGRESS 8 (2018), 
https://www.grantthornton.co.ke/globalassets/1.-member-firms/kenya/insights/pdf/
grant-thornton-women-in-business-2018-report-edited-web.pdf. 
 27. Id.
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specialized” areas, with over 70 percent of managers in human resources 
and medical and health services being female.28 In general, managerial 
positions have become more segregated, so that “female managers are 
concentrated in fields that emphasize people-centered caring skills, while 
men are concentrated in fields dealing with production-centered 
skills.”29 Although there are improvements, there are still troubling 
trends. 
3. Explanations for Disparities 
A diverse literature has developed in recent decades to explain dis-
parities between the success of women as compared to men in rising to 
positions of corporate leadership. This section addresses some reasons 
for the disparities. 
Given the popularity of the term “glass ceiling” and its pervasive-
ness in contemporary popular discourse, it is worth clarifying what it 
means. One comprehensive study defines it as the phenomenon where 
“gender (or other) disadvantages are stronger at the top of the hierarchy 
than at lower levels and that these disadvantages become worse later in a 
person’s career.”30 The Federal Glass Ceiling Commission defined it as 
“artificial barriers to the advancement of women and minorities.”31 The 
first individual to have used the term, Marilyn Loden, has written that 
the glass ceiling consists of “the barriers to advancement [of women] 
that were cultural and not personal.”32 Using more strictly defined em-
pirical criteria,33 one study found strong evidence of a significant gender 
penalty among those later in their careers and higher up in their organi-
zation.34 Other studies have noted that, although most research focuses 
on internal promotion patterns, external recruitment practices may also 
play a role, especially in the technology sector.35 In addition to overt dis-
 28. Women in Management, supra note 21.  
 29. Scarborough, supra note 23. 
 30. See David A. Cotter et al., The Glass Ceiling Effect, 80 SOC. FORCES 655 (2001). 
 31. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., GLASS CEILING COMMISSION - GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING 
FULL USE OF THE NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL (1995). 
 32. Marilyn Loden, 100 Women: ‘Why I Invented the Glass Ceiling Phrase,’ BBC NEWS
(Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-42026266. 
 33. Cotter et al., supra note 30, at 657 (“In practice, this means that glass ceilings are 
measured as the residual differences due to race or gender after controlling for educa-
tion, experience, abilities, motivation, and other job-relevant characteristics.”). 
 34. Id. at 655. 
 35. See Roberto M. Fernandez & Santiago Campero, Gender Sorting and the Glass Ceiling 
in High-Tech Firms, 70 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 1 (2017) (identifying patterns in 
external hiring processes in 443 small-to-medium-sized firms in the technology sector 
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crimination, studies have examined a range of other factors as contrib-
uting to the glass ceiling phenomenon.36
Alongside the “glass ceiling,” the term “glass cliff” has become 
popular recently: it is a phenomenon where women CEOs dispropor-
tionately find themselves in charge of firms in imminent danger of fail-
ing.37 Specifically, “women who break through the glass ceiling into the 
upper echelons of management [tend] to be placed in more precarious 
leadership positions than men,”38 which would account for the relatively 
poorer performance of female CEOs observed by some commentators.39
The phenomenon has received significant attention since it was first 
proposed in 2007, and a recent review of the growing literature found 
that a “decade of research into the glass cliff confirms that it is a robust 
and pervasive phenomenon and a significant feature of the organization-
al landscape for women who achieve high office.”40 Therefore, many 
women in CEO positions within the U.S. face an additional challenge 
in maintaining the firm’s performance and their own reputation.41
Implicit biases that hold back women leaders have received more 
attention recently, particularly the role of stereotypes. Characteristics 
deemed important in leaders, and indeed, leadership in general, are cul-
turally associated with masculinity within the United States, meaning 
that women in leadership positions are essentially in “gender-stereotype-
to find that the seeds of the glass ceiling are evident in candidate pools, as women 
seek entry-level jobs more than they do executive positions or stereotypically male 
IT/engineering positions and men are more likely than women to be interviewed, re-
ceive offers, and be hired). 
 36. See Marianne Bertrand, Coase Lecture - The Glass Ceiling, 85 ECONOMICA 205 (2018) 
(reviewing scholarship that attributes the gender gap to gender-based psychological 
attributes, competing demands on women’s time in the workplace and at home, 
women’s need for greater flexibility in the workplace, and penalties associated with 
such flexibility). 
 37. See, e.g., Michelle K. Ryan & S. Alexander Haslam, The Glass Cliff: Exploring the Dy-
namics Surrounding the Appointment of Women to Precarious Leadership Positions, 32 
ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 549 (2007). 
38. Id. at 563. 
 39. See, e.g., Elizabeth Judge, Women on Board: Help or Hindrance?, TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2003),  https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/women-on-board-help-or-
hindrance-2c6fnqf6fng (noting that companies with female board leadership under-
performed on the Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 Index, whereas companies 
with male board leadership outperformed the index). 
 40. Michelle K. Ryan et al., Getting on Top of the Glass Cliff: Reviewing a Decade of Evi-
dence, Explanations, and Impact, 27 THE LEADERSHIP Q. 446, 453 (2016). 
 41. Christy Glass & Alison Cook, Leading at the Top: Understanding Women’s Challenges 
Above the Glass Ceiling, 27 THE LEADERSHIP Q. 51, 59 – 60 (2016). 
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incongruent” positions.42 Women face the choice of displaying stereo-
typically masculine characteristics and being judged as cold or excessive-
ly argumentative, or, alternatively, of conforming to female stereotypes 
and being judged as too emotional or as poor leaders.43
In addition, one study found that although greater power increased 
total amount of time spent talking for men, this effect did not appear 
for women44—indeed, women seem to suffer backlash from speaking 
up.45 A similar strand of stereotype research has found that women face 
backlash when engaging in self-promotion (although they are not pun-
ished for peer-promoting.)46 Self-promotion “violates female gender ste-
reotypes yet is necessary for professional success.”47 This conclusion is 
especially important for women to consider, as much popular literature 
advocates for women to engage in these more “masculine” behaviors to 
achieve career success,48 without consideration of these backlash effects.49
 42. See Victoria L. Brescoll, et al., Hard Won and Easily Lost: The Fragile Status of Leaders 
in Gender-Stereotype-Incongruent Occupations, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1640 (2010); Anne 
M. Koenig, et al., Are Leader Stereotypes Masculine? A Meta-Analysis of Three Research 
Paradigms, 137 PSYCHOL. BULL. 616 (2011). 
 43. Brescoll et al., supra note 42, at 1642; See also Victoria L. Brescoll & Eric Luis 
Uhlmann, Can an Angry Woman Get Ahead?: Status Conferral, Gender, and Expression 
of Emotion in the Workplace, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 268 (2008) (stating that “men who 
expressed anger in professional settings were more likely to be hired than men who 
expressed sadness and were also given more status, power, and independence in their 
jobs . . . professional women who express anger may experience a decrease, rather 
than an increase, in their status. Women are expected to be kinder and more modest 
than men, and they evoke negative responses from other people if they fail to con-
form to this prescriptive stereotype”); Gary N. Powell, D. Anthony Butterfield & 
Jane D. Parent, Gender and Managerial Stereotypes: Have the Times Changed?, 28 J. OF 
MGMT. 177, 178 (2002) (stating that male characteristics include “assertiveness, in-
dependence, and willingness to take risks”). 
 44. Victoria L. Brescoll, Who Takes the Floor and Why: Gender, Power, and Volublity in 
Organizations, 56 Admin Sci. Q. 622, 622 (2011). 
 45. Women Face Backlash for Speaking Up at Work, ASS’N FOR PSYCHOL. SCI.
(Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.psychologicalscience.org/news/minds-business/women-
face-backlash-for-speaking-up-at-work.html.  
 46. Corinne A. Moss-Racusin & Laurie A. Rudman, Disruptions in Women’s Self-
Promotion: The Backlash Avoidance Model, 34 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 186, 186 
(2010).
 47. Id.
 48. Marguerite Rigoglioso, Researchers: How Women Can Succeed in the Workplace,
INSIGHTS BY STAN. BUS. (Mar. 1, 2011), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/
researchers-how-women-can-succeed-workplace; see also Bonnie Marcus, Self Promo-
tion Is a Leadership Skill, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bonniemarcus/2015/03/02/self-promotion-is-a-leadership-skill/#4dd994234e77. 
 49. Fortunately, the potential for backlash is occasionally addressed in the popular press. 
See, e.g., Joan Williams, Women’s Career Advice: Self-Promote Without the Backlash,
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Research has also shown that, in general, women often face obsta-
cles in developing credibility in the workplace.50 For example, women 
often need to bring a unique skill to the table to establish credibility. 
One study found that women contribute unique skills to the board, and 
that this is the main mechanism through which female board members 
add value in contrast to new male board members.51 Other studies have 
found that female board members cultivate specialties like corporate so-
cial responsibility in order to bolster their credibility: “women inde-
pendent directors can establish or improve their reputational standing 
within the organization through their expertise” in specialized areas like 
social responsibility, marketing, or human resources.52 Women seeking 
corporate leadership positions thus face an additional challenge when 
seeking nomination. 
It should also be noted that some studies examining the effects of 
gender diversity on financial outcomes have led to ambiguous results,53
and some private initiatives to increase leadership diversity have been 
unsuccessful. According to one report, diversity proposals put forth by 
shareholders at major firms in 2016 only saw, on average, 25 percent 
support.54 Moreover, in one prominent example, Apple’s board called 
the demands of one such proposal “unduly burdensome and not neces-
sary.”55 Thus, the gender disparities noted earlier arise from a variety of 
factors. 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 24, 2011, 6:00 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
womens-career-advice_b_1029059.
 50. A. Carol Rusaw, Achieving Credibility: An Analysis of Women’s Experience, 16 REV. OF 
PUB. PERS. ADMIN. 19, 30 (1996). 
 51. See Daehyun Kim & Laura T. Starks, Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards: Do Wom-
en Contribute Unique Skills?, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 267, 269 (2016). 
 52. Enjung Hyun et al., Women on Boards and Corporate Social Responsibility, 8 
SUSTAINABILITY 300 (2016).  
 53. Larelle Chapple & Jacquelyn E. Humphrey, Does Board Gender Diversity Have a Fi-
nancial Impact? Evidence Using Stock Portfolio Performance, 122 J. BUS. ETHICS 709, 
722 (2014). 
 54. Jeff Green & Emily Chasan, Investors Push Corporate Boards to Add Women, People of  
Color, BLOOMBERG News (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-03-02/shareholders-target-pale-male-and-stale-corporate-boards.
 55. Sara Ashley O’Brien, Apple’s Board Calls Diversity Proposal ‘Unduly Burdensome and 
Not Necessary,’ CNN (Jan. 15, 2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/01/15/
technology/apple-diversity/index.html.
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4. The Case for Gender Parity 
Much of the discourse surrounding women in American corporate 
leadership centers around the “business case for [gender] diversity,”56 ra-
ther than the moral or constitutional cases.57 That is, rather than consid-
ering the issue from the perspective of equality and fairness, this research 
has focused on whether gender equality contributes to success on finan-
cial metrics. To this end, a broad literature examines the alleged link be-
tween corporate financial performance and board gender diversity,58 as 
well as the impact of diversity on corporate social responsibility,59 com-
pliance with ethical and social standards,60 and environmental report-
ing.61 This argument is also heavily used by American advocacy groups. 
For example, the “20% by 2020” campaign cites “better decision mak-
ing,” “competitive advantage,” and the “huge, untapped pool of [fe-
male] talent” to support greater female representation on corporate 
boards.62 The Kellogg School of Management has called board gender 
diversity “a business imperative.”63 Even the Federal Glass Ceiling 
Commission, which reported on the issue in 1995, cast its argument in 
terms of the potential for business success, entitling its report “Good for 
Business: Making Full Use of the Nation’s Human Capital.”64 As one 
researcher notes, “it is usually said that firms will appoint more women 
to their boards only if doing so results in economic benefits to the firm 
 56. Julie C. Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From Public Office to Corporate 
Boards, 10 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 449, 464 (2012). 
 57. See e.g., Marek Szydlo, Constitutional Values Underlying Gender Equality on the Boards 
of Companies: How Should the EU Put These Values Into Practice?, 63 INT’L & COMP.
L. Q. 167,180 (2014).  
58. See, e.g., David A. Carter et al., The Diversity of Corporate Board Committees and Firm 
Financial Performance, 1 SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK 1, 40 (2007), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=972763.  
 59. Hyun et al., supra note 52. 
 60. Helena Isidro & Márcia Sobral, The Effects of Women on Corporate Boards on Firm 
Value, Financial Performance, and Ethical and Social Compliance, 132 J. BUS. ETHICS
1, 19 (2014).  
 61. Michelle Siew Huie Phua & Poh-Ling Ho, Female Directors on Corporate Boards: 
Does Female Leadership Drive Corporate Environmental Transparency?, 34 SHS WEB 
OF CONFERENCES 1 (2017).  
 62. 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS, supra note 1. 
 63. Victoria Medvec, What Will It Take to Get More Women on Boards?, KELLOGG 
INSIGHT (Jul. 6, 2018), https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/what-will-it-
take-to-get-more-women-on-boards. 
 64. GLASS CEILING COMM’N, supra note 31. 
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[…] for that reason, the bulk of academic research investigates the eco-
nomic outcomes for firms that have female directors on their boards.”65
B. The European Union 
Gender equality is one of the founding values of the European Un-
ion, with the principle of equal pay being included in the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Economic Community in 1957 (known as the 
Treaty of Rome).66 Gender equality has been promoted ever since, yet 
progress is slow.67 The latest policy plan of the E.U., the “Strategic En-
gagement for Gender Equality 2016 – 2019,” aims at advancing gender 
balance in decision-making, closing the gender pay gap, promoting 
equal economic independence for women and men, ending gender 
based violence, and even contains measures promoting gender equality 
beyond the E.U.68
1. Women on Corporate Boards 
The corporate world demonstrates that the glass ceiling is still in 
place, as many large companies in Europe include a low number of 
women in positions of leadership, although quotas in some countries 
have improved the numbers on some corporate boards.69 According to 
 65. Isidro & Sobral, supra note 6o, at 4. 
 66. Sophie Jacquot, European Union Gender Equality Policies Since 1957, ENCYCLOPÉDIE 
POUR UNE HISTOIRE NOUVELLE DE L’EUROPE (Oct. 30, 2017), https://ehne.fr/en/
article/gender-and-europe/gender-citizenship-europe/european-union-gender-
equality-policies-1957. 
 67. Rachael Kennedy, International Women’s Day: EU Progress on Gender Equality is Mov-
ing at a ‘Snail’s Pace,’ EURONEWS (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.euronews.com/
2019/03/08/eu-progress-on-gender-equality-is-moving-at-a-snail-s-pace-according-
to-officals.
 68. EUR. COMM’N, STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT FOR GENDER EQUALITY 2016-2019,
https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/strategic_engagement_
for_gender_equality_en.pdf. 
 69. Many countries throughout Europe have a dual board structure, with a management 
board and a supervisory board. The supervisory board is most analogous to the board 
structure in countries like the U.S. and Japan, utilizing a unitary board. EUROPEAN
COMMISSION PRESS RELEASE, WOMEN ON BOARDS: COMMISSION PROPOSES 
40% OBJECTIVE (Nov. 14, 2012), https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1205_
en.htm.  For more information and a summary of dual board laws in various Europe-
an  nations, see  Roger Baker, Board Structures in Europe, EUR. CONFEDERATION OF 
DIR. ASS’N, http://ecoda.org/fileadmin/library_private/14_IFC/1_Roger_Barker-
_Board_structures_in_Europe.docx.  
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the 2019 Report on Equality between Women and Men in the E.U., 
women held 29.3 percent of supervisory board positions (non-executive 
positions) of large companies in the E.U.-28, but only 16.6 percent of 
executive positions.70 Some European countries have tried to improve 
women’s presence on boards with the help of gender quotas. For in-
stance, Norway was the first country to legislate board quotas (in 2004) 
and many countries followed with laws setting required or optional quo-
tas for women on supervisory boards.71 The legislative quotas seem to 
bring positive results, as nine E.U. countries have already registered at 
least 25 percent women on the boards of their largest companies in Oc-
tober 2017, while France was the only E.U. country72 in which there 
were at least 40 percent of each gender at the board level (as of October 
2017).73
2. Women in Management 
Although the supervisory board plays an important role in a com-
pany, as it controls the activities of the management board, the man-
agement (i.e., executive) board still holds a significant role. According to 
the 2019 Report on Equality Between Women and Men in the EU, 
“critical positions within boards are still rarely filled by women.”74 In the 
E.U., fewer than one in ten companies has a female chair or CEO.75
Moreover, at the E.U. level, women held 16.6 percent of executive posi-
tions, which is regarded by the European Commission as marginal pro-
gress.76
 70. EUR. COMM’N., 2019 REPORT ON EQUALITY BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN IN 
THE EU 30 (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/aid_development_
cooperation_fundamental_rights/annual_report_ge_2019_en.pdf. 
 71. Alina Dizik, Do Quotas for Corporate Boards Help Women Advance?, CHICAGO 
BOOTH REV., June 15, 2015, https://review.chicagobooth.edu/magazine/spring-
2015/do-quotas-for-corporate-boards-help-women-advance. Norway is not a member 
state of the European Union. 
 72. EUR. COMM’N., 2018 REPORT ON EQUALITY BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN IN THE 
EU, at 31 (2018), https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/
950dce57-6222-11e8-ab9c-01aa75ed71a1. 
 73. Id.
 74. EUR. COMM’N, supra note 70, at 30.  
 75. Id.
 76. Id.
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3.  Explanations for Disparities 
The reasons in the E.U. for gender disparities in top management 
and on boards are similar to the reasons in the U.S. and thus are not 
repeated here. In Europe, however, there are also institutional factors 
driving the movement to increase female representation on supervisory 
boards, such as welfare provisions (e.g. child care provisions, maternity 
leave provisions, policies to assist with the work-life balance), political 
coalitions, and a legacy of initiatives.77 Left-leaning governments are 
currently more likely to require more female representation on 
supervisory boards. For example, a survey of 201 Norwegian firms 
found a correlation between women on boards and an increase in board 
development activities as well as a decreased level of conflict.78 Though 
as presented above, the findings regarding the relationship between gen-
der equality on boards and firm performance are sometimes ambiguous 
or contradictory, gender equality is still a priority for the E.U.: as stated 
in 2019 by V?ra Jourová, Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and 
Gender Equality, “[t]he EU cannot fail on enforcing this important 
right to equality and on making use of the huge potential lying in half 
of its population.” 79 Therefore, though the progress is slow and though 
the financial effects of an increased female presence on corporate boards 
in the E.U. still need to be further researched, the E.U. remains com-
mitted to its gender equality policy. 
4. The Case for Gender Parity 
As in the U.S., scholarship in the E.U. has focused on whether 
there is a significant link between firm performance and the number of 
women in positions of top leadership. One study found that in 
Denmark, having a higher percentage of women on supervisory boards 
could result in better performance.80 Another study regarding women in 
European-listed companies suggests positive effects of diverse boards on 
 77. Siri Terjesen et al., Legislating a Woman’s Seat on the Board: Institutional Factors Driv-
ing Gender Quotas for Boards of Directors, 128 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 233, 246 (2015). 
 78. Sabina Nielsen & Morten Huse, The Contribution of Women on Boards of Directors: 
Going Beyond the Surface, 18 CORP. GOV.: AN INT’L REV. 136, 145 (2010). 
 79. EUR. COMM’N., 2019 REPORT ON EQUALITY BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN IN THE 
EU, 4 (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/aid_development_
cooperation_fundamental_rights/annual_report_ge_2019_en.pdf. 
 80. See Mijntje Lückerath-Rovers, Women on Boards and Firm Performance, 17 J. OF 
MGMT. & GOV. 491 (2011), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2
Fs10997-011-9186-1.pdf.
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corporate governance and even on firm performance.81 A futher study 
found that companies with a higher proportion of women in top 
management perform better.82
Some studies suggest a positive relationship between the number of 
female supervisory board members and the number of female officers in 
management.83 Small improvements can be seen with a legally mandated 
quota for women on supervisory boards.84 Scholars have analyzed the 
impact of gender on small business performance in the United Kingdom 
and concluded that there are “some considerable differences by sex in 
quantitative economic and financial performance measures.”85
Another study shows that in 3,876 public companies, the presence 
of independent female directors is necessary on supervisory boards to 
optimize firms’ performance.86 This means that, when no women are 
included as supervisory board members, the companies’ results were 
worse (measured by Tobin’s Q and shown by the Return on Assets). 
Another study of 151 of the capital market-listed German firms shows 
that only after a critical mass of about 30 percent of women in absolute 
positions is attained, can higher firm performance be reached.87
Other studies, however, did not replicate these findings.88 For 
example, one study points to a lack of evidence that female 
representation in supervisory boards improves profitability.89 In a study 
 81. Achim Buchwald & Hanna Hottenrott, Women on the Board and Executive Duration 
– Evidence for European Listed Firms, DÜSSELDORF INST. FOR COMPETITION ECON., 
at 19 (2014), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp1650.pdf. 
 82. See Georges Desvaux et al., Women Matter: Gender Diversity, a Corporate Performance 
Driver, 1 MCKINSEY & CO. 23 (2007), http://www.raeng.org.uk/publications/
other/women-matter-oct-2007.
83. See Diana Bilimoria, The Relationship Between Women Corporate Directors and Women 
Corporate Officers, 18 J. OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES, 47, 53 (2006); Siri Terjesen et al., 
Women Directors on Corporate Boards: A Review and Research Agenda, 17 CORP. GOV.:
AN INT’L REV. 320, 324 (2009).  
 84. James Corkery & Madeline Taylor, The Gender Gap: A Quota for Women on the 
Board, BOND UNIV. CORP. GOVERNANCE J. (2012), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
fe63/02c541de832c14ca340da32497a08677d420.pdf (accessed 12 Sept. 2019). 
 85. Peter Rosa et al., Gender as a Determinant of Small Business Performance: Insights from 
a British Study, 8 SMALL BUS. ECON. 463, 474 (1996).  
 86. Siri Terjesen et al., Does the Presence of Independent and Female Directors Impact Firm 
Performance? A Multi-Country Study of Board Diversity, 20 J. OF MGMT &
GOVERNANCE 447 (2015). 
 87. Jasmin Joecks et al., Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Performance: What 
Exactly Constitutes a “Critical Mass?,” 118 J. BUS. ETHICS 61, 68 (2013). 
 88. Caspar Rose, Does Female Board Representation Influence Firm Performance? The Dan-
ish Evidence, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 404, 411 (2007).  
89. Daniel Ferreira, Board Diversity: Should We Trust Research to Inform Policy?, 23 CORP.
GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 108, 110 (2015). 
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of 108 large German corporations between 2009 and 2013, there was 
not enough evidence to indicate a significant relationship between 
gender diversity and firms’ financial performance.90 The authors of the 
study believe the results could differ if a larger sample is analyzed or if 
small companies rather than large companies are considered. 
Many actors have urged companies to more effectively use 
women’s talent: for example, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, an international economic coalition to 
stimulate economic progress, emphasized that women “can provide 
society with different perspectives and approaches to management, 
organisation and business issues.”91 The International Labour Organiza-
tion reported in 2015 that “more concerted efforts and advocacy are 
needed to share information on the benefits of utilizing women’s talent 
and skills at all levels, including in the boardroom.”92 The European In-
stitute for Gender Equality argues in favor of gender equality by indicat-
ing its benefits: “a more gender equal EU would have strong, positive 
GDP impacts growing over time, a higher level of employment and 
could respond to challenges related to the ageing population in the 
EU.”93 Whether these arguments will lead to achieving gender equality 
at the E.U. level and beyond is still uncertain, yet important steps to-
ward this goal have been made and the measures implemented, such as 
gender quotas, show results. 
C. Japan 
Japanese women have long been underrepresented in positions of 
power. In 2016, the female participation rate in administrative and 
managerial positions was only 13 percent compared to 43.4 percent in 
 90. Artur Dick, Female Directors on German Supervisory Boards and Firms’ Financial Per-
formance at 7 (July 2, 2015) (unpublished Bachelor Thesis, University of Twente) 
https://essay.utwente.nl/67308/1/DICK_BA_IBA.pdf.  
 91. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD REPORT TO G7 LEADERS ON 
WOMEN AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A SUMMARY OF RECENT DATA AND POLICY 
DEVELOPMENTS IN G7 COUNTRIES, at 2 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/gender/
OECD-Report%20-to-G7-Leaders-on-Women-and-Entrepreneurship.pdf.
 92. Women in Business and Management. Gaining Momentum, INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR ORGANIZATION (ILO) 4 (2015), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/—-dgreports/—-dcomm/—-publ/documents/publication/wcms_334882.pdf. 
 93. Economic Case for Gender Equality in the EU, EUROPEAN INST. FOR GENDER 
EQUALITY (2017), https://eige.europa.eu/gender-mainstreaming/policy-areas/
economic-and-financial-affairs/economic-benefits-gender-equality/economic-case.
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the United States and 39.2 percent in Sweden.94 At listed companies,95
women occupied only 3.4 percent of the executive positions, compared 
to 30 percent in France and 17 percent in the United States.96
1. Women on Corporate Boards 
A Morgan Stanley Capital International progress report regarding 
women on boards found that most companies based in Asian countries 
such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China continue 
to have all male boards.97 However, the report showed that in recent 
years there has been a decline in the proportion of companies with all 
male boards, from 56.1 percent in 2016 to 45 percent in 2018. Despite 
this positive trend, Japanese corporate boards continue to be male dom-
inated.98
2. Women in Management 
As Figure 1 shows, in 2018, there was a considerable gap between 
the proportion of working women and that of women in managerial po-
sitions in many developed countries. 
 94. Proportion of Women in Leadership Positions in Various Fields, at 4 
(2018), http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/pr_act/pub/pamphlet/women-
and-men18/pdf/1-2.pdf. 
 95. “Firm whose shares are listed (quoted) on a stock exchange for public trading. Also 
called quoted company,” Listed Company, BUSINESS DICTIONARY, http://www.
businessdictionary.com/definition/listed-company.html.
 96. Nobuko Kobayashi, Let’s Get Real About Female Equality in Corporate Japan -The 
Government Must Push Companies to Set Aside Stereotypes and Promote Women,
NIKKEI ASIAN REV., Jan. 22, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Let-s-get-real-
about-female-equality-in-corporate-Japan2 (accessed Sept. 3, 2018). 
 97. Morgan Ellis & Meggin Thwing Eastman, Women on Boards - Progress Report 2018,
MORGAN STANLEY CAP. INT’L 3 (Dec. 2018), https://www.msci.com/documents/
10199/36ef83ab-ed68-c1c1-58fe-86a3eab673b8 (accessed Jul. 21, 2019). 
 98. Id. at 13.  
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Figure 1: Proportion of women workers and women in administrative and 
managerial positions in 2018 (Source: Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet 
Office).99
A 2018 document issued by the Japanese Gender Equality Bureau 
Cabinet Office reveals that, despite Japan ranking 17 of 188 countries 
on the Human Development Index scale measuring access to healthcare 
and education,100 the Gender Gap Index ranks Japan a dismal 114 of 
144 countries on female economic participation and opportunity.101 The 
2017 Global Gender Gap Report shows that, although Japan is making 
progress in closing the gender gap in terms of equal access to health care 
and education, it lags behind many developed countries in terms of fe-
male participation in the workforce, in particular in leadership and 
lawmaking positions.102
 99. GENDER EQUITY CABINET OFFICE, Proportion of Women in Leadership Positions in 
Vari-
ous Fields, at 5 (2019), http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/pr_act/pub/pamph
let/women-and-men19/pdf/1-2.pdf. 
 100. Proportion of Women in Leadership Positions in Various Fields, supra note 94. 
 101. Id.
 102. Id.
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3. Explanations for Disparities 
Gender roles in family and society differ across cultures. Research-
ers note that perceptions of female leadership are different in Asia be-
cause of different traditions and religious beliefs.103 For example, in 
some Asian countries with a strong Confucian tradition such as Japan 
and Korea, despite women’s increased participation in the workforce 
and improved social status, the idea of women in leadership positions is 
quite challenging.104 In Japanese culture, the ideology of “good wife, 
wise mother,” or ryôsai kenbo, regarding women as caregivers and nur-
turers, has influenced generations, and has contributed to a clear deline-
ation of the working spheres of men and women.105 Women are ex-
pected to be nurturing, supportive, intuitive and communicative, and 
not to engage in typically-male activities such as pursuing a career.106
Unlike in the United States, where many women work to further their 
career,107 Japanese women work to support their family.108 The idea that 
women must prioritize their roles of wife and mother has pervaded so-
cial, economic, fiscal, and corporate policies, which ascribe distinct 
realms to men and women and regard them not as equals, but as com-
plementary agents.109 To this day, these cultural pressures tend to affect 
modern women's career orientations and their aspirations regarding ac-
ceding to leadership positions.110
On the other hand, their lack of power in the public sphere is 
compensated by almost absolute power in the household. One feminist 
author has found that although traditional roles of women have been 
changing, women are still facing internal and external pressures to as-
 103. Yonjoo Cho et al., Asian Women in Top Management: Eight Country Cases, 18 HUM.
RESOURCE DEV. INT’L 407 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13678868.2015.
1020717.
 104. Young Lan Kim, The Change of Women’s Social Status in Korea: Progress and Reaction,
27 ASIAN WOMEN 1 (Mar. 2011), http://e-asianwomen.org/xml/00938.pdf. 
 105. Usui et al., Women, Institutions, and Leadership in Japan, 27 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 3, 
86, (2003). 
 106. See id.
 107. Margaret A. Shaffer, Janice R. W. Joplin & Yu-Shan Hsu, Expanding the Boundaries 
of Work–Family Research: A Review and Agenda for Future Research, 11 INT’L J. OF 
CROSS CULTURAL MGMT. 221, 408 (2011). 
 108. Eun-Suk Lee, Jae Yoon Chang & Hyosun Kim, The Work–Family Interface in Korea: 
Can Family Life Enrich Work Life?, 22 INT’L J. OF HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 20 
(2011), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09585192.2011.573976; 
Masako Ishii-Kuntz, Japanese Fathers: Work Demands and Family Roles, in MEN,
WORK, AND FAMILY 45 – 67 (Jane C. Hood ed., 1993).  
 109. Usui et al., supra note 105, at 88.  
 110. Id.
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sume their traditional roles.111 There is also considerable resistance to 
women becoming involved in spheres in which men have almost abso-
lute hegemony.112
The increasing access to higher education of Japanese women, 
combined with the country's need to align its gender policy with those 
of other developed countries, has necessitated redefining the status of 
women in Japanese society.113 In recent years, the number of Japanese 
women in higher education has been higher than ever before. Through-
out the 1990s and 2000s, the percentage of women attending four-year 
universities increased from 15 percent to 44 percent.114 Another im-
portant trend is that the number of companies that hire women in ca-
reer-track jobs has been increasing. The percentage of such companies 
grew from 11 percent in 2000 to 17 percent in 2008.115
The downside is that career-track employment and leadership posi-
tions remain a male-dominated field in Japan. Professor Linda Lindsey's 
phrase “men have careers; women have jobs” has never rung more 
true.116 Gendered beliefs and practices are responsible for keeping wom-
en away from leadership positions.117 Professor Kumiko Nemoto talks 
about the "vertical segregation" of women in the workplace as the main 
cause for excluding women from management jobs and points out that, 
despite a change in female working patterns in the past years, the num-
ber of female managers has yet to rise.118 Among factors that bar women 
from attaining top positions, she identifies prioritizing lifelong employ-
ment of male workers, harassment (including maternity harassment),119
 111. Ayako Kano, Backlash, Fight Back, and Back-Pedaling: Responses to State Feminism in 
Contemporary Japan, 1 INT’L J. ASIAN STUDIES 8, at 53 (2011). 
 112. Id. at 53. 
 113. Elise K. Tipton, Being Women in Japan, 1970-2000, in WOMEN IN ASIA 225 (Louise 
Edwards & Mina Roces, eds., 2000). 
 114. Mari Osawa, Gender-Equality and the Revitalization of Japan’s Society and Economy 
Under Globalization, https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/ja/publication/other/jrft3q
00000014pn-att/JICA-RI_Japan_1_Osawa.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2019). 
 115. Kumiko Nemoto, When Culture Resists Progress: Masculine Organizational Culture 
and Its Impacts on the Vertical Segregation of Women in Japanese Companies, 27 WORK,
EMP. & SOC’Y 153, 154 (2013). 
 116. LINDA L. LINDSEY, GENDER ROLES. A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (4th ed. 2005). 
 117. See Nemoto, supra note 115, at 155 – 58.  
 118. Id.
 119. According to Matahara Net, a Japanese organization founded by former victim of 
maternity harassment Sayaka Osakabe, the term “maternity harassment” (abbreviated 
“matahara” in Japanese), “refers to the unfair treatment of women, namely harass-
ment, both physical and mental, instilled upon working women when they become 
pregnant or give birth, which may involve termination of their employment, termina-
tion of their contract of employment, or forcing them to voluntarily leave their em-
ployment. Along with power harassment and sexual harassment, matahara is one of 
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the government's support of the male-breadwinner model over the dual-
income family model through taxation policy, discriminatory views of 
female managers, and the absence of role models of women with author-
ity.120
Women entering career-track jobs are expected to work hard to 
compete with their male co-workers. This means long hours, after-work 
drinking parties, and having to cope with the feeling of not belonging in 
an exclusively male environment.121 In the Japanese organizational cul-
ture there is a clash between organizational masculinity and women in 
positions of power.122 Professor Nemoto refers to this phenomenon as 
“the organizational processes whereby gendered beliefs and customs 
shape workers’ construction of identity in the workplace.”123 In male-
dominated organizations, men tend to assert their superiority by dis-
playing demeaning, disrespectful, or exclusionary attitudes regarding the 
qualities and capacities of women.124 In order to climb the corporate 
ladder, and in the absence of female role models, Japanese career women 
tend either to emulate male patterns of behavior, such as competitive-
ness or ruthlessness, or to ingratiate themselves to their superiors.125
While in androcentric organizational cultures like Japan, “bossy” behav-
ior is generally seen as the norm in a male leader, similar behavior in a 
woman is considered a “marker of deviant femininity” and sanctioned as 
such.126 Women are expected to be modest and submissive, qualities that 
are perceived as “feminine.”127 Career women who sacrifice their “femi-
ninity” tend to be regarded as unlikable by male coworkers or subordi-
nates, and aggressive or harsh by female subordinates.128 They are often 
perceived by male coworkers as incompetent, unprofessional, or too 
the three major forms of harassment that burden Japanese women in the workforce.” 
MATAHARA NET, http://www.mataharanet.org/en/what-is-matahara/ (last visited 
June 20, 2019). 
 120. Nemoto, supra note 115, at 154 – 56.  
 121. SARAH RUTHERFORD, WOMEN’S WORK, MEN’S CULTURES: OVERCOMING
RESISTANCE AND CHANGING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES 15 – 16 (2011). 
 122. Nemoto, supra note 115, at 156 – 57.  
 123. Id. at 156 (citing Robin Ely & Irene Padavic, A Feminist Analysis of Organizational 
Research on Sex Differences, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 1121 (2007)). 
 124. See generally Patricia Yancey Martin, ‘Mobilizing Masculinities’: Women’s Experiences 
of Men at Work, 8(4) ORG. ARTICLES 587 (2001) (discussing how men assert their 
masculinity at work through analyzing the experiences of six women at work). 
 125. Nemoto, supra note 115, at 157 – 58.  
 126. Id. at 163. 
 127. See GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES,
BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS 297 (2d ed. 
2001).
 128. See Nemoto, supra note 115, at 157–58, 163. 
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emotional, even hysterical.129 It seems that Japanese career women can 
do little to earn the respect of their male co-workers, and must strive 
harder than their European and Western peers. They have to walk the 
line between being feminine (and risking appearing weak, immoral or 
incompetent), and being masculine (and being considered bossy and 
harsh).
4. The Case for Gender Parity 
Women's potential to boost economic development has been de-
bated in Japan since the 1990s. In 2012, the International Monetary 
Fund’s managing director Christine Lagarde said, “Women can save Ja-
pan . . . Today you have five out of ten Japanese women out of the job 
market, as opposed to two out of ten men.”130 In a report issued in 
2012, the IMF predicted that an increase in female workforce participa-
tion from 63 percent in 2010 to 70 percent by 2030 would add four 
percent to the GDP.131 Researcher Kathy Matsui compares the male-
heavy Japanese workforce to an athlete “running a marathon with one 
leg.”132 She estimates that having more women in the workforce and in 
leadership positions would help boost the country’s GDP by as much as 
12.5 percent.133 In a so-called “blue sky scenario,” Matsui predicts that, 
should the large proportion of women currently involved in part-time 
employment work longer hours or be hired in full-time jobs, the GDP 
increase could be as high as 15 percent.134 Moreover, at the micro-
economic level, a study based on the data on female managers disclosed 
by 297 firms between June 2018 and April 2019 showed that the firms 
with the highest numbers of female managers (above 15 percent) had 
 129. Id. at 163. 
 130. WILLIAM PESEK, JAPANIZATION: WHAT THE WORLD CAN LEARN FROM JAPAN’S LOST 
DECADES 40 (2014).
 131. Emma Dalton, Womenomics, ‘Equality’ and Abe’s Neo-liberal Strategy to Make Japanese 
Women Shine, 20 SOC. SCI. JAPAN J. 95, 96 (2017) (citing Chad Stienbert & Masato 
Nakane, Can Women Save Japan? 5 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 
WP/12/248)).
 132. PESEK, supra note 130, at 41. 
 133. Kathy Matsui et al., Womenomics 4.0: Time to Walk the Talk, GOLDMAN SACHS 
JAPAN: PORTFOLIO STRATEGY, 1, 5 (May 30, 2014), https://www.goldmansachs.com/
insights/pages/macroeconomic-insights-folder/womenomics4-folder/womenomics4-
time-to-walk-the-talk.pdf.
 134. Kathy Matsui et al., Womenomics 5.0: 20 Years On Progress, Areas for Improvement, 
Potential 15% GDP Boost, GOLDMAN SACHS JAPAN: PORTFOLIO STRATEGY, 1,10 
(Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/pages/womenomics-
5.0/multimedia/womenomics-5.0-report.pdf.
302 michigan  journal  of  gender & law [Vol. 26:279 
the highest 5-year average sales growths (over six percent), as well as the 
highest return on equity compared to those with fewer female leaders.135
II. Legal Backdrop: Gender Discrimination and Quotas 
In this Section, we analyze the legal environments in the U.S., sev-
eral countries in the E.U., and Japan surrounding gender discrimination 
and efforts to eradicate it. The imposition of gender quotas has been le-
gally mandated with some success in some E.U. countries, but such a 
strategy would face significant legal hurdles in the United States. In Ja-
pan, government-sanctioned targets have yielded rather disappointing 
results.
A. The United States 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination 
in employment based on certain protected characteristics.136 These pro-
tected characteristics include an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”137 Congress conceived of the Act as a way to help mi-
norities attain a level playing field in society, and Title VII of the Act 
was designed to do that in employment.138 Protection for women was 
not originally part of the bill because their issue—unequal pay for equal 
work—was considered solved by the Equal Pay Act, passed the prior 
year.139 Sex was added to the bill as a protected characteristic at the last 
minute, however, as a way to derail the legislation.140 It passed despite 
 135. Id.
 136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Westlaw through P.L. 116 – 50). 
 137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Westlaw). 
 138. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 (1989) (“The intent to drive 
employers to focus on qualifications rather than on race, religion, sex, or national 
origin is the theme of a good deal of [Title VII]’s legislative history.”). 
 139. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (Westlaw through P.L. 116 – 50). 
 140. Cynthia Deitch, Gender, Race and Class Politics and the Inclusion of Women in Title 
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 7 GENDER & SOC’Y 183, 186 (1993) (“The gender 
discrimination proposal conveniently fit all three prongs of the southern strategy. It 
was potentially divisive, it could easily have sidetracked the debate, and it promised to 
complicate matters for the enforcement agency (the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, or EEOC) created by Title VII. When the civil rights bill passed the 
House, two days after the debate over the gender amendment, all but one of the men 
who had voted for the amendment voted against the whole bill.”); Jo Freeman, The 
Origins of the Women’s Liberation Movement, 78 AM. J. OF SOC., 792, 798 (1973) 
(discussing how opponents of the bill aimed to defeat it by adding an objectionable 
term so as to divide the coalition that supported the legislation); Mary E. Guy & 
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the addition, and protection against discrimination on the basis of sex 
(subsequently interpreted as gender) was added to the groups protected 
from discrimination.141 Because of the lack of legislative history and 
agreement on what it meant, protection for women under Title VII has 
usually lagged behind that of other groups.142 Thus, advances in protec-
tion for minorities are often cited when women initially seek those same 
rights.143
Through subsequent case law, sexual harassment was also recog-
nized as discrimination based on sex under Title VII.144 The Act allows 
courts to mandate “appropriate affirmative action” as a remedy in cases 
of intentional unlawful discrimination.145 Additionally, in the 1989 case 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that the female 
plaintiff could bring suit against Price Waterhouse under a “mixed mo-
tive” gender discrimination theory, where discriminatory reasons were a 
“motivating” factor to a plaintiff’s adverse employment decision.146 This 
motivating factor language was then included in the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.147
Vanessa M. Fenley, Inch by Inch: Gender Equity Since the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 34 
REV. OF PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN., 1, 44 (2013).  
 141. Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Fifty Years Later: The Legacy of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 34 J. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 251, 430 (2015). 
 142. See Deitch, supra note 140, at 189, 199 (“[W]hen the state makes policy that suppos-
edly benefits women or expands women’s rights, it does so within a framework that 
also reinforces women’s subordination. . . [T]he EEOC initially attempted to ignore 
women in the implementation process.”) (citing CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD
A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 226-27 (1989)); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories 
about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in 
Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1770-
71 (1990). 
 143. See, e.g., DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: WORKPLACE
JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA 185 (2005); ALICE S. ROSSI,
FEMINISTS IN POLITICS: A PANEL ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST NATIONAL WOMEN’S
CONFERENCE 16 (1982) (“The primary goals of NOW (National Organization for 
Women) in its founding year were closely modeled after those of civil rights organiza-
tions and of the Kennedy Commission itself; that is, to expand women’s economic 
rights and opportunities. NOW was to be a kind of NAACP for women.”).  
 144. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated on other grounds sub 
nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (Westlaw through P.L. 116 – 53). 
 146. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250, 258 (1989). However, the defend-
ant could escape liability by showing that “it would have made the same decision 
even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.” 
 147. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Westlaw). Unlike in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, if the 
defendant can show it would have made the same employment decision, the defend-
ant is still liable; however, plaintiff’s relief is limited. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Westlaw). 
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Modern affirmative action is a product of the 1960s, when there 
was a push to correct social disparities and to give equal access to the re-
sources that could help every American achieve a good life in society.148
These resources included decent housing, education, and employ-
ment.149 In the educational context, the Supreme Court did away with a 
long-standing precedent that held segregated schools were legal.150 This, 
in turn, led to integration in public schools.151 It took the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, to address other areas such as private 
employment.152
Quotas are a form of affirmative action that mandate numbers such 
as the percentage of women or minorities that must be in certain posi-
tions. Quotas aim to address the under-representation of minority 
groups,153 and speed up attainment of equality by mandating specific 
minimum numbers for representation. Quotas have been used in Euro-
pean countries with regard to equality for women on boards.154 Quotas, 
however, face legal hurdles in the United States, as will be explained be-
low. Instead, affirmative action has been used in the United States.155
Affirmative action uses goals, the attainment of which is not required, 
for the same purpose.156 It is an inferior method that is explained by the 
history of the drive for equality by the legislatures and courts in the last 
50-plus years. 
In the late 1970s, companies, universities, and governmental insti-
tutions began to give preferences on the basis of race to groups that tra-
ditionally suffered discrimination.157 Governmental racial preferences 
were challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitu-
 148. See Hugh Davis Graham, The Origins of Affirmative Action: Civil Rights and the Regu-
latory State, 523 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 50 (1992).  
 149. See, e.g., JAMES W. BUTTON, BLACKS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: IMPACT OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN SOUTHERN COMMUNITIES (1989).  
 150. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 151. In this context, the Constitution protects citizens against discrimination by govern-
ment action. It does not address actions by private actors such as schools.  
 152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Westlaw). 
 153. Thekla Morgenroth & Michelle K. Ryan, Quotas and Affirmative Action: Understand-
ing Group-Based Outcomes and Attitudes, 3 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS,
2 https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/spc3.12374. 
 154. See infra Section II.B for a discussion of the use of quotas for women on boards in 
some European countries. 
 155. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  
 156. See R.G., What is Affirmative Action?, THE ECONOMIST (June 15, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/06/15/what-is-affirmative-action. 
 157. Terry Morehead Dworkin et al., The Role of Networks, Mentors, and the Law in Over-
coming Barriers to Organizational Leadership for Women with Children, 20 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 83, 88 (2013). 
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tion.158 In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme 
Court laid the groundwork for allowing racial preferences.159 Justice 
Powell, who cast the deciding vote, cited one of the school’s justifica-
tions for the preference—the educational benefits that flow from an 
ethnically diverse student body—to be a constitutionally permissible 
goal.160 At the same time, explicit racial quotas were found unconstitu-
tional because they completely excluded non-preferred groups from ad-
mission seats.161 Subsequent decisions laid out the parameters of affirma-
tive action and goals, as these preferences are known,162 and courts 
extended the concepts to workers in the private sector.163 Justice Powell’s 
ban on quotas in Bakke still stands, however. 
Almost a decade later, affirmative action was extended to women.164
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, the Court held that an affirmative 
action plan that considered being female to be a “plus factor” in the hir-
ing process was valid when there was a “manifest imbalance” in terms of 
women’s representation.165 The Court noted that no men were automat-
ically excluded from the program and no positions were set aside for 
women, i.e., that there were no quotas.166 According to the Court, in 
order for an affirmative action program to be valid, there must be: 1) 
evidence of a manifest imbalance or past discrimination; 2) an existing 
plan under which the woman was favored; 3) a temporary plan (lasting 
only until the imbalance was corrected); 4) only qualified people select-
ed; 5) no unnecessary trammeling of the interests of the majority; and 6) 
goals, not quotas.167
Subsequent court decisions have shown that the legitimacy of an 
affirmative action plan turns on the level of scrutiny to be applied.168 A 
divergence developed between public sector affirmative action plans and 
those voluntarily adopted by private sector organizations. Public sector 
 158. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 159. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18. The Court was split 4-1-4. Justice Powell, in casting the 
deciding vote, found that the University’s program could not be sustained. Id.
 160. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12. 
 161. The Court cited Harvard’s program as an example of a successful, race-conscious 
program that does not use quotas. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316 – 20.  
 162. When Title VII was enacted, affirmative action in private employment was men-
tioned only as a remedy to intentional discrimination. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
5(g)(1) (Westlaw through P.L. 116 – 56). 
 163. See, e.g., United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979). 
 164. Jonathan S. Leonard, Women and Affirmative Action, 3 J. ECON. PERSP., 61, 62 
(1989).
 165. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631 – 34 (1987). 
 166. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638. 
 167. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640 – 41.  
 168. See Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Farmer, 930 P.2d 730, 735 (Nev. 1997). 
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plans have been subjected to much closer scrutiny because they involve 
discrimination by the government, necessarily implicating the Constitu-
tion’s demand for equal treatment.169 In general, the courts have become 
much more restrictive regarding what is sufficient to justify affirmative 
action in the public sector, while the private sector has been relatively 
unaffected because the same constitutional constraints are not applica-
ble.170 Thus, private sector affirmative action plans are examined under 
the Title VII rules discussed in Johnson.
Voluntarily-adopted plans in the private sector, if they follow the 
restrictions listed above, can also be sustained. Having a preference for a 
woman outside of an established affirmative action program, though, 
can subject the employer to suits for “reverse discrimination.”171 Begin-
ning with the 1989 case of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson,172 which in-
volved set-asides in public works projects, and continued in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,173 the Supreme Court has demanded a strict 
scrutiny analysis for affirmative action in the public sector, which re-
quires a compelling governmental interest to justify the affirmative 
treatment and that the plan be narrowly tailored to achieve that inter-
est.174
The use of quotas in the United States to rectify racial and gender 
imbalances has a long and troubled history. At times, quotas were used 
to limit or prevent certain groups from emigrating to the U.S.175 Quotas 
have also been used in other sectors such as employment and education 
for the same purpose.176 For example, many of the most prestigious uni-
versities, such as Princeton, Yale, and Harvard, had quotas on the num-
ber of Jewish people whom they would admit in the first half of the 
 169. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490–92 (1989). 
 170. Dworkin et al., supra note 157, at 91–92. 
 171. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb. v. Dawes, 522 F.2d 380, 381 (8th Cir. 
1975) (suit by men who earned less than women after minimum wages for women 
were set to redress wage imbalance); Rudebusch v. Arizona, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 
1064-67 (D. Ariz. 2006) (regarding a raise in women’s pay for equity purposes with-
out adjusting men’s pay). The plaintiff in a reverse discrimination case usually has the 
additional proof requirement of showing that the employer is one of those unusual 
employers who discriminates against the majority. 
 172. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 477–78.  
 173. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 174. See, e.g., J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 477–78; Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227.  
 175. Mae M. Ngai, The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamina-
tion of the Immigration Act of 1924, 86 J. AM. HIST., 67, 67 (1999). 
 176. MARCIA GRAHAM SYNNOTT, THE HALF-OPENED DOOR: DISCRIMINATION AND 
ADMISSIONS AT HARVARD, YALE AND PRINCETON, 1900-1970 (Greenwood Press 
1979).
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twentieth century.177 Stanford University limited the number of women 
admitted in order to avoid the “feminization” of the University, a limi-
tation that persisted into the 1960s.178 Jane Stanford, who endowed the 
University, felt that having too many women was not consistent with 
honoring her deceased son, in whose memory the University was found-
ed.179 Thus, quotas in the United States have been used to control a 
group that, at the time, was considered undesirable in some way. Today, 
Harvard University is being sued for allegedly setting quotas on Asian-
Americans in a variation on that theme.180 Harvard allegedly is using 
quotas in the name of diversity or racial balancing, otherwise known as 
affirmative action.181 The Harvard suit is seen as an attempt to bring an 
affirmative action case before the current Supreme Court, viewed by 
some as conservative, in the hope that it will lead the Court to ban af-
firmative action.182
B. The European Union 
This Section briefly discusses the laws and regulations with regard 
to gender diversity in seven E.U. countries. These countries, France, 
Germany, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, and Finland, were the 
home countries of the largest and most liquid stocks of the Eurozone in 
2015.183 All seven countries are represented by companies included in 
the EURO STOXX 50 index, and each of the countries has regulations 
 177. Shira Telushkin, The Vanishing Ivy League Jew, TABLET (Oct. 15, 2018, 9:30 PM), 
https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/272350/the-vanishing-ivy-
league-jew; see also, Ben Sales, Harvard Once Capped the Number of Jews. Is It Doing 
the Same Thing to Asian Americans Now?, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (Oct. 17, 
2018, 12:47PM), https://www.jta.org/2018/10/17/united-states/harvard-once-
capped-the-number-of-jews-is-it-doing-the-same-thing-to-asians-now. 
 178. Sam Scott, Why Jane Stanford Limited Women’s Enrollment to 500, STANFORD MAG.,
Sept. 2018, at 48. She pictured the university as being a rival to Harvard and Oxford, 
neither of which admitted women. Id. at 50. 
 179. The total number was eventually set at 500. Susan B. Anthony was appalled that a 
woman would do this to other women. Id.
 180. See, e.g., Melissa Korn & Nicole Hong, Harvard Faces Probe over Admissions Policy,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2017, at A1. 
181. Anemona Hartocollis, Harvard Rated Asian-American Applicants Lower on Personality 
Traits, Suit Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2018, at A1. The class of 2021 is 22.2 percent 
Asian-American. Id.
 182. See id.
 183. EURO STOXX 50, STOXX, https://www.stoxx.com/index-details?symbol=SX5E 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2017).  
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regarding the inclusion of women on corporate boards.184 Excepting 
Finland, where board gender diversity is regulated in the country’s 
corporate governance code, all other countries have integrated these 
regulations into national laws.185 In France, Spain, and the Netherlands, 
the regulations apply to companies surpassing certain thresholds 
regarding their number of employees or their turnover.186 In Germany, 
the law applies to listed companies that are fully obliged to employee co-
determination, or the right of the employees to participate in the deci-
sion-making process of a company.187
Five of the seven countries have a target quota for women on cor-
porate boards.188 France and Italy instituted a two-step approach. In 
these countries, one quota was required to be reached by the companies 
within a given period of time with a stricter quota required thereafter.189
The laws on quota requirements for women on boards tend to focus on 
the supervisory board.190 Within the EURO STOXX 50 countries, only 
in the Netherlands does the quota for women also apply to management 
boards.191 This index has a fixed number of components and is part of 
the STOXX blue-chip index family.192 Apart from the rules in Finland, 
which are based on company self-regulation, all other quota require-
ments for women are compulsory.193 Nevertheless, in Spain and the 
Netherlands the laws do not include any sanctions for companies failing 
to achieve the defined female quota.194 Hence, it is questionable whether 
these quotas are, in reality, binding. 
 184. Women’s Quota, DIW BERLIN, https://www.diw.de/de/diw_01.c.412682.de/presse/
diw_glossar/frauenquote.html (last updated Jan. 2019).  
 185. Gender Quotas, FINNISH INST. FOR HEALTH & WELLNESS, https://thl.fi/en/web/
gender-equality/gender-equality-in-finland/decision-making/gender-quotas (last up-
dated June 26, 2018); Women’s Quota, supra note 184.  
 186. Women’s Quota, supra note 184. 
 187. Quote für Mehr Frauen in Führungspositionen: Privatwirtschaft, BUNDESMINISTERIUM 
FÜR FAMILIE, SENIOREN, FRAUEN UND JUGEND (May 5, 2017), 
https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/themen/gleichstellung/frauen-und-arbeitswelt/quote-
privatwitschaft/quote-fuer-mehr-frauen-in-fuehrungspositionen—
privatwirtschaft/78562?view=DEFAULT.  
 188. Women’s Quota, supra note 184. 
 189. Id.
190. Id.
 191. Id.
 192. EURO STOXX 50, supra note 183.  
 193. Women’s Quota, supra note 184. 
194. Id.
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In 2007, Spain implemented the Law for the Effective Equality of 
Women and Men, or the Equality Law.195 The law establishes a 40 per-
cent quota for women on corporate boards. Sanctions, however, are not 
integrated into the law.196 The Amendment of the Companies Act, effec-
tive December 2014, requires companies to define targets for female 
representation on the board and to prepare a plan on how to achieve 
that target.197
Belgium, France, and Italy introduced quotas for women on boards 
in 2011.198 All three laws are compulsory and sanction companies that 
are noncompliant.199 The Belgian law guarantees that women constitute 
a minimum percentage of the board of directors; it requires a quota of at 
least 33 percent women.200 In France, the regulation was codified as part 
of the constitution as an extension of the parity clause to “social and 
professional responsibilities.”201 The law targets supervisory boards and 
requires 20 percent women on the boards by 2014 and 40 percent by 
2017.202 The sanction in France is identical to the one in Belgium.203 In 
both countries, board seat appointments violating the law are invalid 
and must be vacated.204 The Italian Golfo-Mosca Act requires boards to 
be comprised of 20 percent women by 2012 and 33 percent by 2015.205
However, the regulation is only valid for three consecutive elections of 
the supervisory board after the implementation of the law.206 Companies 
not reaching the quotas face financial penalties—the minimum fine is 
 195. Reyes Palá-Laguna & Luisa Esteban-Salvador, Gender Quota for Boards of Corpora-
tions in Spain, 17 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 379, 379–80 (2016). 
 196. Tània Verge & Emanuela Lombardo, The Differential Approach to Gender Quotas in 
Spain: Regulated Politics and Self-Regulated Corporate Boards, in EUROPEAN 
UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE WORKING PAPERS 7 (2015).  
 197. Palá-Laguna & Esteban-Salvador, supra note 195, at 383–84.  
 198. Women’s Quota, supra note 184. 
 199. Id.
 200. Petra Meier, Gender Quotas in Belgium: A Never Ending Story of Gendering Compart-
mentalized Citizenship? 3 (European University Institute, Working Paper 
Law 2015/25, 2015), https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/35975/LAW_
2015_25.pdf.
 201. European Parliament, The Policy on Gender Equality in France 12 (2015), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/510024/IPOL_IDA(2
015)510024_EN.pdf.
 202. Id. at 12.  
 203. Women’s Quota, supra note 184. 
 204. Id.
 205. Giulia Ferrari et al., Gender Quotas: Challenging the Boards, Performance, and the Stock 
Market, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF LABOR (IZA), DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 10239
4 (2016).  
 206. Id.
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€100,000, while the maximum fine is €1,000,000—and a breakup of 
the supervisory board.207
In 2013, the Netherlands integrated a 30 percent quota for women 
on boards into the Dutch Civil Code.208 The quota is compulsory but 
without sanctions, and it applies to the supervisory and the management 
boards of a company.209 Originally, the quota was only intended to be in 
effect until 2016, with the idea that the percentages of women on 
boards would reach the 30 percent target by then.210 The target was not 
achieved, however. In 2017, the existing law was extended, requiring 
companies to attain 20 percent female board membership by 2019.211 If 
the 20 percent target is achieved, companies will have until 2023 to 
achieve 30 percent female board membership.212 If the 20 percent target 
is not then achieved, the government will impose a 30 percent target on 
the company and combine it with sanctions.213
In Germany, the law requires supervisory boards to meet a quota of 
30 percent women.214 If companies do not fulfill the quota, any vacant 
seats on the supervisory board stay unoccupied until filled with a wom-
an to achieve the quota.215 Moreover, companies must define targets for 
the percentage of women on their supervisory and management boards 
as well as for their top management-level positions.216 These targets must 
be disclosed and may not be set any lower than the current percentage 
of women in these positions.217 The time span to achieve these targets is 
five years.218
 207. Women’s Quota, supra note 184. 
 208. See Sonja A. Kruisinga & Linda Senden, Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards in the 
Netherlands: Waiting on the World to Change, in 1 GENDER DIVERSITY IN THE 
BOARDROOM: THE USE OF DIFFERENT QUOTA REGULATIONS 177, 177 (Cathrine 
Seierstad et al., eds., 2017).  
 209. See id. at 187.  
 210. Id. at 177. 
 211. Id. at 187.  
 212. Id. at 189. 
 213. Id.
 214. Gesetz für die gleichberechtigte Teilhabe von Frauen und Männern an 
Führungspositionen in der Privatwirtschaft und im öffentlichen Dienst [FüPoG] 
[Law for the Equal Participation of Women and Men in Leadership Positions in the 
Private and Public Sector], Apr. 24, 2015, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL l], at 
654, art. 3 (Ger.), http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_
BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl115s0642.pdf.
 215. Id.
 216. Id.
 217. Id. at 654, art. 3.  
 218. Id.
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Finland has a self-regulated system in which companies set their 
own goals for the percentage of women on their corporate boards.219
The regulation applies to companies that have been listed since 2008. If 
only one gender is represented on a corporate board, the company must 
publicly explain the reason for it.220
The above laws and regulations are summarized in the following 
table. 
Table 1: Laws regarding gender quota in countries having companies in the 
EURO STOXX index (Main Source: DIW Berlin, 2018, Women 
Quota).221
Country Law  
promulgation 
Quota Deadline Boards Company type Sanctions 
Belgium 2011 30% 2017 Management
board 
Listed companies & 
state-owned enterprises
Any new appointment 
is void if the quota is 
not met 
Finland - - - - - -
France 2011 20% / 
40% 
2014/
2017 
Supervisory 
board 
Listed companies, 
companies with over 
500 employees or more 
than 50 million Euro 
sales
Any new appointment 
is void if the quota is 
not met 
Germany 2015 30% 2016 Supervisory 
board 
Listed companies and 
companies subjected to 
co-determination 
The position remains 
vacant if the quota is 
not met 
Italy 2011 20% / 
30% 
2012/
2015 
Supervisory 
board 
Listed companies & 
state-owned enterprise 
Financial penalty up to 
one million Euro 
Netherlands 2011 30% 2016 Supervisory and 
management
board 
Listed companies & 
companies with over 
250 employees 
No
Spain 2007 40% 2015 Management
board 
State-owned enterprises 
and corporations & 
companies with over 
250 employees 
No
We conducted an empirical examination of the companies of the 
EURO STOXX index as of 2015 to establish whether these companies 
 219. See Virginie Issumo et al., Country Tables – Länderberichte, 19 DJBZ ZEITSCHRIFT DES 
DEUTSCHEN JURISTINNENBUNDES [DJBZ] 119, 122 (2016).  
 220. Id.
 221. Women’s Quota, supra note 184. Finland does not have gender quota legislation.  Sec-
tion 8 of the Corporate Governance Code set by the Securities Market Association 
for listed companies, which applies to all companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Ex-
change, includes a recommendation that both genders be represented on the board, 
and requires a public statement if it deviates from the recommendation.  This ap-
proach has been successful in Finland. See FINNCHAM WOMEN LEADERS PROGRAM,
RECORD NUMBER OF WOMEN DIRECTORS IN FINISH LISTED COMPANIES, The Sev-
enth WOMEN DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVES REPORT, 11–13 (2017), 
https://naisjohtajat.fi/wp-content/uploads/sites/28/2016/05/eng-keskuskauppa
kamarin-naisjohtajaselvitys-2017.pdf. 
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have successfully fulfilled the board gender diversity requirements of 
their respective jurisdictions. We examined the percentage of female 
members in supervisory positions. The EURO STOXX 50 Index was 
selected to represent the 50 largest companies among 19 supersectors in 
the year 2015, and includes companies from seven Eurozone countries. 
The following table gives an overview of the 50 companies that 
make up the EURO STOXX index, their sector, country of origin and 
the percentage of women on their supervisory boards. 
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Table 2: Overview of the 50 EURO STOXX companies from 2015 
(Information from STOXX).222
 222. EURO STOXX 50, supra note 183; EURO STOXX 50 Werte, FINANZEN.NET,
https://www.finanzen.net/index/euro_stoxx_50/werte (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). In-
formation also obtained from the annual reports of all 50 EURO STOXX compa-
nies: Air Liquide, Airbus Group SE, Allianz, Anheuser-Busch InBev, ASML Holding, 
Assicurazioni Generali, AXA, BASF, Bayer, BCO Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, BCO 
Santander, BMW, BNP Paribas, Carrefour, Daimler, Danone, Deutsche Bank, 
Deutsche Post, Deutsche Telekom, E.ON, Enel, Engie, Eni, Essilor International, 
Fresenius, GRP Société Générale, Iberdrola, Industria de Diseño Textil, ING Group, 
Intesa Sanpaolo, L’Oréal, LVMH Moet Hennessy, Münchener Rück, Nokia, Or-
ange, Philips, Safran, Saint Gobain, Sanofi, SAP, Schneider Electric, Siemens, Tele-
fónica, Total, Unibail-Rodamco, UniCredit, Unilever, VINCI, Vivendi, Volkswagen.  
Nr.? Company's?name Sector Country No.?of
?Women?
Total?
supervisory
?board?
members
Percentage?
of?
Women?on?
the
?Board
Earnings?
before?
Taxes?(?Mil?
€)
Employees
?total
EBT/Total?
no.
?Of?
Employees?
(in?
thousands)
1 Air?Liquide Chemicals FR 5 12 41.7% 2,490.4 50,000 49.8
2 AIRBUS?GROUP?SE Industrial?Goods?&?Services FR 2 12 16.7% 2,359.0 136,574 17.3
3 ALLIANZ Insurance DE 4 13 30.8% 9,763.0 142,459 68.5
4 ANHEUSER?BUSCH?INBEV Food?&?Beverage BE 2 14 14.3% 11,482.3 150,000 76.5
5 ASML?HLDG Technology NL 3 9 33.3% 1,856.1 14,681 126.4
6 ASSICURAZIONI?GENERALI Insurance IT 4 10 40.0% 3,293.0 70,000 47.0
7 AXA Insurance FR 5 14 35.7% 7,521.0 98,279 76.5
8 BASF Chemicals DE 3 12 25.0% 5,297.0 112,435 47.1
9 BAYER Chemicals DE 4 20 20.0% 5,254.0 116,800 45.0
10 BCO?BILBAO?VIZCAYA?ARGENTARIA Banks ES 3 12 25.0% 4,428.0 137,968 32.1
11 BCO?SANTANDER Banks ES 4 11 36.4% 9,172.0 193,863 47.3
12 BMW Automobiles?&?Parts DE 6 20 30.0% 8,706.0 122,244 71.2
13 BNP?PARIBAS Banks FR 7 14 50.0% 9,790.0 189,077 51.8
14 CARREFOUR Retail FR 4 16 25.0% 1,673.0 380,920 4.4
15 DAIMLER Automobiles?&?Parts DE 5 20 25.0% 12,280.0 284,015 43.2
16 DANONE Food?&?Beverage FR 5 13 38.5% 1,925.0 99,771 19.3
17 DEUTSCHE?BANK Banks DE 7 22 31.8% ?6261.0 101,104 ?61.9
18 DEUTSCHE?POST Industrial?Goods?&?Services DE 7 20 35.0% 2,055.0 497,745 4.1
19 DEUTSCHE?TELEKOM Telecommunications DE 8 20 40.0% 4,754.0 225,243 21.1
20 E.ON Utilities DE 2 12 16.7% ?5841.0 56,490 ?103.4
21 ENEL Utilities IT 2 6 33.3% 5,229.0 67,914 77.0
22 ENGIE Utilities FR 11 19 57.9% ?5262.0 154,950 ?34.0
23 ENI Oil?&?Gas IT 1 5 20.0% ?3535.0 28,246 ?125.2
24 ESSILOR?INTERNATIONAL Health?Care FR 3 16 18.8% 1,120.0 61,000 18.4
25 FRESENIUS Health?Care DE 0 12 0.0% 3,262.0 222,305 14.7
26 GRP?SOCIETE?GENERALE Banks FR 7 14 50.0% 5,878.0 145,700 40.3
27 IBERDROLA Utilities ES 5 13 38.5% 2,931.3 30,938 94.7
28 Industria?de?Diseno?Textil?SA Retail ES 2 8 25.0% 3,212.7 152,854 21.0
29 ING?GRP Banks NL 2 8 25.0% 5,680.0 54,873 103.5
30 INTESA?SANPAOLO Banks IT 5 19 26.3% 4,056.0 90,807 44.7
31 L'OREAL Personal?&?Household?Goods FR 6 15 40.0% 4,517.4 82,900 54.5
32 LVMH?MOET?HENNESSY Personal?&?Household?Goods FR 4 17 23.5% 5,983.0 125,346 47.7
33 MUENCHENER?RUECK Insurance DE 8 20 40.0% 3,223.0 43,554 74.0
34 NOKIA Technology FI 2 8 25.0% 1,511.0 56,690 26.7
35 ORANGE Telecommunications FR 6 15 40.0% 3,197.0 156,000 20.5
36 PHILIPS Industrial?Goods?&?Services NL 3 9 33.3% 623.0 112,959 5.5
37 SAFRAN Industrial?Goods?&?Services FR 4 17 23.5% ?1355.0 70,087 ?19.3
38 SAINT?GOBAIN Construction?&?Materials FR 6 15 40.0% 622.0 170,372 3.7
39 SANOFI Health?Care FR 5 14 35.7% 5,243.0 115,631 45.3
40 SAP Technology DE 4 18 22.2% 3,991.0 76,986 51.8
41 SCHNEIDER?ELECTRIC Industrial?Goods?&?Services FR 5 13 38.5% 1,736.0 160,000 10.9
42 SIEMENS Industrial?Goods?&?Services DE 6 20 30.0% 5,983.0 348,000 17.2
43 TELEFONICA Telecommunications ES 2 18 11.1% 316.0 129,890 2.4
44 TOTAL Oil?&?Gas FR 4 12 33.3% 3,677.5 96,019 38.3
45 UNIBAIL?RODAMCO Real?Estate FR 4 11 36.4% 2,678.3 1,966 1,362.3
46 UNICREDIT Banks IT 1 5 20.0% 1,775.9 43,479 40.8
47 UNILEVER?NV Personal?&?Household?Goods NL 6 11 54.5% 7,133.0 168,921 42.2
48 VINCI Construction?&?Materials FR 6 15 40.0% 3,022.0 185,452 16.3
49 VIVENDI Media FR 6 14 42.9% 1,196.0 16,395 72.9
50 VOLKSWAGEN?PREF Automobiles?&?Parts DE 3 20 15.0% ?5688.0 114,006 ?49.9
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The allocation among different sectors can be seen for each country of 
the EURO STOXX 50 index in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: The 50 EURO STOXX companies in Europe and their sectors  
(Source: Information obtained from STOXX).223
As shown in Figure 2, the percentage of women is not much higher 
in technologically more innovative sectors such as Media (42.86 per-
cent) compared to traditional sectors such as Construction & Materials 
(40.0 percent) and Personal & Household Goods (39.36 percent). 
Figure 3 shows the number of companies of each country in the 
EURO STOXX 50 index. Most EURO STOXX companies are located 
in France (20), followed by Germany (14), Spain (5), Italy (5), the 
Netherlands (4), Belgium (1), and Finland (1). 
 223. EURO STOXX 50, supra note 183. See supra note 222 for a list of the 50 companies. 
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Figure 3: Number of EURO STOXX 50 companies per country (Source: 
own representation based on the information from STOXX).224
Figure 4 shows the percentage of women in supervisory boards in 
each of the seven countries, as given by the EURO STOXX companies. 
Figure 4: Number of women on the supervisory board of EURO STOXX 
companies in 2015 in the Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain, Germany, 
Finland and Belgium. (Information with regard to the number of women 
on the supervisory board was extracted from the 2015 annual reports of the 
respective companies).225
In six of the seven countries, the percentage of women on 
supervisory boards in 2015 averaged above 25 percent. In contrast, only 
two countries had at least 25 percent female management board 
 224. Id.
 225. See supra note 222 for a list of the 50 companies. 
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members in 2014.226 The countries with the highest percentages of 
women on supervisory boards are the Netherlands with 36.6 percent 
and France with 36.4 percent. Figure 4 shows that, as of 2015, the 
expected female quota of 30 percent to 40 percent had not yet been 
achieved by EURO STOXX companies. 
Germany and France have the greatest number of companies in the 
EURO STOXX 50 index, thus we examined the data from these 
countries more closely. The frequency distribution in Figure 5 shows 
that most of France’s EURO STOXX companies have attained 40 
percent female representation. One French company has a percentage of 
women approaching 60 percent on its supervisory board (57 percent) 
and four French enterprises have supervisory boards comprised of nearly 
50 percent women. 
Figure 5: Frequency distribution of women on the supervisory board of 
French EURO STOXX companies in 2015 (Information with regard to the 
number of women on the supervisory board was extracted from the 2015 
annual reports of the respective companies).227
Women are less well-represented on Germany’s supervisory boards. 
There are no German companies with 50 percent women on its 
supervisory board. Two companies reached the highest percentage of 
 226. Bettina Binder et al., Is Enterprise Success a Women’s Topic?, 9 CONF. OF THE   
EUROMED ACAD. OF BUS. 267, 273 (2016). 
 227. Information obtained from the annual reports of all French EURO STOXX compa-
nies: Air Liquide, Airbus Group SE, AXA, BNP Paribas, Carrefour, Danone, Engie, 
Essilor International, GRP Société Générale, L’Oréal, LVMH Moet Hennessy, Or-
ange, Safran, Saint Gobain, Sanofi, Schneider Electric, Total, Unibail-Rodamco, 
VINCI, Vivendi. 
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women on supervisory boards for German enterprises: 40 percent. One 
company reached 35 percent and another 32 percent. See Figure 6. 
Figure 6: Frequency distribution of women on the supervisory boards of 
German EURO STOXX companies in 2015 (Information with regard to 
the number of women on the supervisory board was extracted from the 2015 
annual reports of the respective companies).228
Though the above analysis offers a limited view of the percentage 
of women on boards at the European level, it can be seen that the 
French companies in the EURO STOXX index not only comply with 
the regulations, they exceed the requirements. It should also be noted 
that Germany’s legal requirements were established later than those of 
other European countries. The German EURO STOXX company 
boards are made up of between 15 percent and 40 percent women, ex-
cept one company, Fresenius, which had an all-male supervisory board 
in 2015. Some of the Italian and Spanish companies that are part of the 
EURO STOXX index still need to increase the number of women on 
their boards in order to be compliant with the regulations, while in the 
Netherlands, of the four EURO STOXX companies, only one did not 
fulfill the quota. Belgium and Finland had one company each in the 
2015 EURO STOXX index, thus it is difficult to draw conclusions 
about the percentage of women on the supervisory boards of these at the 
country level. Gender parity in the boardroom as achieved by some 
French companies sends a positive signal showing that barriers to gender 
parity can be overcome. 
 228. Information obtained from the annual reports of all German EURO STOXX com-
panies: Allianz, BASF, Bayer, BMW, Daimler, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Post, 
Deutsche Telekom, E.ON, Fresenius, Münchener Rück, SAP, Siemens, Volkswagen.  
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The main takeaway from analyzing women’s representation on the 
corporate boards of the largest European companies as of 2015 is the 
effectiveness of the board gender quotas. Though the progress is regard-
ed as slow, gender quotas did trigger adoption of gender-balanced 
boards. 
C. Japan 
As early as the nineteenth century, female Japanese activists have 
been striving for female advancement in society, for equality in the 
workplace, and against gender discrimination.229 Prior to the Meiji Res-
toration in 1868, women were subservient to the patriarchal system in 
which all power was held by the senior male member of the family.230
After 1868, under the influence of Western cultural values, a few legisla-
tive changes improved women's lives, such as restricting trafficking in 
women, granting divorce rights, and compulsory elementary education 
for girls.231 The women's liberation movement generally, and particular-
ly the 1911 Bluestocking (Seito) movement, modeled after the one in 
Britain, militated against the patrilineal extended family system.232
The Western women's liberation movements of the 1960s and 
1970s had a considerable impact in Japan, spurring a proliferation of 
groups and organizations that demanded equal employment opportuni-
ties and pay, sexual liberation, reproductive rights, and equal political 
representation.233 These two decades witnessed unprecedented economic 
growth and coincided with the establishment of the traditional model of 
breadwinner-husband and housekeeper-wife.234 However, in the 1980s, 
the novelty of the Japanese economic miracle started to wear off and the 
single income model was no longer sustainable for the average family. 
Married women began to seek employment, most of which was tempo-
rary or part-time.235
 229. See SANDRA BUCKLEY, BROKEN SILENCE: VOICES OF JAPANESE FEMINISM 11 (1997).  
 230. YUJI IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND JAPANESE LAW 205 
(1998).
 231. Id.
 232. Yasuko Morihara Grosjean, From Confucius to Feminism: The Japanese Woman’s Quest 
for Meaning, 11 ULTIMATE REALITY AND MEANING 166 (1988). 
 233. Elise K. Tipton, Being Women in Japan, 1970-2000, in WOMEN IN ASIA 208, 208 
(Louise Edwards & Mina Roces, eds.) (2000). 
 234. Machiko Matsui, Evolution of the Feminist Movement in Japan, 436 NWSA J. 435, 
441 (1990). 
 235. Id.
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In response to international pressure to eliminate sexual discrimina-
tion, as well as a result of changes in labor market trends,236 the govern-
ment passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) in 
1986, guaranteeing equal employment opportunities for men and wom-
en, and enabling women's access to career-track jobs.237 Over the follow-
ing decade, also dubbed “the lost decade,” which marked the beginning 
of Japan's economic downturn, a number of victories were achieved on 
the feminist front. These were the Childcare Leave Law (1992), the 
Nursing Care Insurance Law (1997), the Law to Promote Specified 
Nonprofit Activities (1998), the Law for Punishing Acts Related to 
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography and for Protecting Children 
(1999), the Anti-Stalking Law (2000), and the Law for the Prevention 
of Spousal Violence and the Protection of Victims (2001).238 Although 
the scope and some of the effects of these laws have been positive in 
terms of promoting equality for women, some authors point out that 
they were in fact serving politicians’ and businesses’ hidden agendas and 
contributed to widening the gender divide.239
One feminist author, Ayako Kano, contends that the passing of 
these laws in the 1990s was a sign that the state was embracing the ideas 
of feminism.240 However, scholar Emma Dalton has noted that gender 
equality policies envisioning a society “where women shine” can have an 
ambiguous effect: they create a polarization not only between men and 
women, who must compete for a decreasing number of regular jobs, but 
also between a minority of privileged women who can and will benefit 
from these measures to advance their careers and the vast majority of 
women who work in temporary, low paid jobs.241
As a signatory to the United Nation Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Japan has come 
under intense international pressure to tackle the issue of female un-
 236. Lorraine Parkinson, Japan’s Equal Employment Opportunity Law: An Alternative Ap-
proach to Social Change, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 604, 619 – 20 (1989). 
 237. Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), Koyô no Bun’ya niokeru Danjo 
no Kintôna Kikai oyobi Taigû no Kakuhôtô ni kansuru Hôritsu [Act on Securing, 
Etc. of Equal Opportunity and Treatment Between Men and Women in Employ-
ment] Law No. 113 of 1972, translated in MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOUR AND 
WELFARE, https://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/06-Seisakujouhou-11900000-Koyoukintou
jidoukateikyoku/0000133458.pdf (last visited Jul. 30, 2019). 
 238. Kano Backlash, supra note 111, at 43. 
 239. See Emma Dalton, Womenomics,’Equality’ and Abe’s Neo-Liberal Strategy to Make Jap-
anese Women Shine, 20 SOC. SCI. JAPAN J. 95, 97 – 99 (2017). 
 240. Kano, Backlash, supra note 111, at 43. 
 241. Dalton, supra note 239, at 102.  
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derrepresentation in leadership positions over the past decade.242 Apart 
from the EEOL, which was revised in 1997 and again in 2005-2006, a 
number of initiatives were adopted with the declared aim of promoting 
women in public positions of influence.243 These were the Basic Act for 
a Gender Equal Society (1999), followed by four Basic Plans for a Gen-
der Equal Society (adopted in 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015), and the 
Law for the Promotion of Women's Participation and Advancement in 
the Workplace (in force since April 2016).244
The Equal Employment Opportunity Law claimed its purpose was 
to end any form of gender discrimination against women and to grant 
equal employment opportunities.245 Nevertheless, the law was a “double-
edged sword;”246 although it allowed women greater access to career-
track jobs, it required them to comply with traditionally male working 
practices, such as long hours, dangerous conditions, or being reassigned 
to other parts of the country.247 The immediate effect of the law was a 
further rise in non-regular (part-time, dispatch, temporary) female 
workers, as working mothers did not find this “equal employment op-
portunity” solution feasible.248 Unlike regular jobs, non-regular em-
ployment offers substantially lower wages, no advancement prospects, 
no job security, and little or no eligibility for some of the benefits of 
regular workers, such as child care leave.249 The law was the result of a 
 242. IWASAWA, supra note 230, at 206. 
 243. Stephanie Assmann, Gender Equality in Japan: The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Law Revisited, ASIA-PACIFIC J.: JAPAN FOCUS (Nov. 2014) at 12, 
http://apjjf.org/2014/12/45/Stephanie-Assmann/4211.html (last visited Sep. 14, 
2018).
 244. Ayako Kano, Japanese Feminist Debates: A Century of Contention on Sex, Love, and 
Labor, HONOLULU: UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII PRESS (2016) https://doi.org/10.21313/
hawaii/9780824855802.001.0001; Ayako Kano, Womenomics and Acrobatics: Why 
Japanese Feminists Remain Skeptical About Feminist State Policy, 2 FEMINIST 
ENCOUNTERS: A J. OF CRITICAL STUD. IN CULTURE & POL. 1 (2018). 
 245. Act on Securing, Etc. of Equal Opportunity and Treatment between Men and 
Women in Employment, Act No. 113, Article 6 (1972) (Japan) (“With regard to the 
following matters, employers shall not discriminate against workers on the basis of 
sex. (i) Assignment (including allocation of duties and grant of authority), promo-
tion, demotion, and training of workers; (ii) Loans for housing and other similar 
fringe benefits as provided by Ordinance of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Wel-
fare; (iii) Change in job type and employment status of workers; and (iv) Encour-
agement of retirement, mandatory retirement age, dismissal, and renewal of the labor 
contract”). 
 246. Stephanie Assmann, Gender Equality in Japan: The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Law Revisited, 12 ASIA-PAC. J.: JAPAN FOCUS, Nov. 3, 2014, at 16–17.  
 247. Dalton, supra note 239, at 99. 
 248. See id. at 99–100.  
 249. See id. 
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compromise among three interest groups: conservative politicians, who 
supported the traditional view of women as stay-at-home wives and 
mothers, business leaders, who were in dire need of a cheap labor force, 
and feminists, who sought to end sex discrimination.250 It did little in 
the way of promoting women in leadership positions, and thirty years 
after the enactment of the law, the number of female leaders remains 
low.251
The Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society (the “Basic Law”), en-
acted in 1999, was a positive measure toward promoting female leaders 
in top positions.252 It can be considered the de facto beginning of Japa-
nese womenomics as it reflects, more than ever before, the government's 
positive attitude toward acknowledging women's role in society.253 It 
was followed by four Basic Plans for a Gender Equal Society, adopted in 
2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015.254 The Basic Law encourages employers to 
establish targets of promoting women in decision-making positions.255 It 
is worth noting, however, that the Japanese name of the Basic Law, 
Danjo kyôdô sankaku (??????), which translates literally to 
 250. Kano, Backlash, supra note 111, at 50 (citing Midori Hotta, Danjo kyo?do? sankaku
teki akurobatto [Male-Female Co-Participatory Acrobatics], 131 IMPACTION 106 
(2002)).
 251. Helen Macnaughtan, Womenomics for Japan: Is the Abe Policy for Gendered Employ-
ment Viable in an Era of Precarity?, 13 ASIA-PAC. J.: JAPAN FOCUS, Mar. 30, 2015, at 
14.
 252. See Dalton, supra note 239, at 97. 
 253. See id. 
 254. GENDER EQUALITY BUREAU CABINET OFF., BASIC PLAN FOR GENDER EQUALITY
(2010), http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/about_danjo/lbp/basic/index.htm; 
Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office, Women and Men in Japan 2018, 
http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/pr_act/pub/pamphlet/women-and-
men18/index.html (accessed Sept. 16, 2019).
 255. See Basic Act for a Gender-Equal Society, Act No. 78, Article 3 (1999) (Japan) (“The 
Formation of Gender Equal Society shall be carried out, aiming at respect for the 
dignity of men and women as individuals, not treating men and women in a way that 
discriminates against them based on gender, securing opportunities for men and 
women as individuals to exercise their abilities and respect for other human rights of 
men and women”); see also Basic Act for a Gender-Equal Society, Act No. 78, Article 
5 (1999) (Japan) (“Formation of Gender Equal Society shall be undertaken with the 
aim to secure opportunities for men and women to jointly participate as equal mem-
bers of society in planning and deciding policies of the State or local governments or 
ones of private organizations”); Basic Act for a Gender-Equal Society, Act No. 78, 
Article 8 (1999) (Japan) (“The State is responsible for the comprehensive formulation 
and implementation of policies on promotion of the Formation of Gender Equal So-
ciety (including positive action; the same shall apply hereinafter) pursuant to the 
basic principles on the Formation of Gender Equal Society prescribed in Articles 3 to 
the preceding Article”); Mari Ôsawa, Government Approaches to Gender Equality in 
the Mid-1990s, 3 SOC. SCI. JAPAN J. 4 (2000). 
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“Male-Female Joint Participation Plan,” fails to include the term “equal-
ity,” or byôdô in Japanese.256 The omission of the term has been inter-
preted as symptomatic of conservative politicians' wariness of associating 
this initiative with the concept of gender equality in the Western sense, 
which would suppose affirmative action and gender quotas.257
In 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, cognizant of women’s im-
mense potential to help the Japanese economy recover from decades-
long torpor, pledged to turn Japan into “a place where women shine” by 
increasing the proportion of leading positions occupied by women to 30 
percent by 2020.258 His womenomics agenda included: 
1. increasing female workforce participation for ages 25 to 44 
from 68 percent (2012) to 77 percent by 2020; 
2. increasing the ratio of women who reenter employment af-
ter their first child from 38 percent (2010) to 55 percent 
by 2020; 
3. increasing female leadership participation to 30 percent by 
2020; 
4. expanding child care and eliminating child care waiting 
lists by 2017; and 
5. increasing the number of fathers who take up paternity 
leave from 2.6 percent in 2011 to 13 percent by 2020.259
In April 2014, the Japan Business Federation, the Keidanren, com-
piled and published an “Action Plan on Women's Active Participation 
in the Workforce.”260 It detailed the necessity and expected effects of at-
tracting women to the labor force.261 It also highlighted problems such 
as the lack of continuity and recent changes in female employment pat-
terns, shortage of child care facilities, relocation issues, low female repre-
sentation in managerial positions, gender stereotypes, male-centered 
corporate practices, and low numbers of women in the STEM fields.262
It cited future initiatives such as disclosure policies, female-targeted ca-
reer development efforts, changing the attitudes of managers and per-
 256. Ôsawa supra note 255, at 6. 
 257. Id.
 258. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, Address at the Sixty-Eighth Session of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations (Sept. 26, 2013) (transcript available at 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201309/26generaldebate_e.html). 
 259. Matsui et al., supra note 133, at 13. 
 260. Keidanren, Action Plan on Women’s Active Participation in the Workforce (2014), 
https://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/policy/2014/029_proposal.pdf. 
 261. Id. at 2–4.  
 262. Id.
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sonnel, decreases in working hours, reform of the tax and social security 
systems, elimination of child care waiting lists, and encouraging wom-
en's access to STEM fields.263
The Basic Law has yielded mixed results. Despite its success in at-
tracting more women into the labor force (50 percent of the total 
number and 70 percent of women aged between 15 and 64 as of 
2018),264 statistics indicate that half these women are in non-regular 
employment.265 The Basic Law did not, however, empower women as it 
had promised, as the initial targets of promoting women in leadership 
positions failed to be achieved. As one researcher points out, the Basic 
Law stemmed less from a real concern for gender parity and more from 
the need to pull women into the workforce to solve the demographic 
crisis and the shortfall of working-age people.266 Some critics regard the 
Basic Law as an attempt to take women from their comfort zone (i.e. 
family, child care) and “place them in stressful positions of leader-
ship.”267 It is seen as an attempt to utilize women for national goals, by 
requiring them to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the company, only 
to blame them for the dwindling birthrate in case of negative out-
comes.268
Subsequently, an Act on Promotion of Women's Participation and 
Advancement in the Workplace was adopted and became effective in 
April 2016.269 The Act obliges companies with more than 300 employ-
ees to set numerical targets and disclose the number and positions of 
their female employees as well as the measures they have taken to pro-
mote women's active participation in the company’s decision-making 
process.270 Feminist researcher Ayako Kano considers this to be a mild 
form of a “carrot and stick” approach, with companies assessed accord-
ing to their efforts to promote women.271 The Act, however, fails to real-
istically address the problem of gender inequalities with regard to une-
qual wages and child care burdens falling disproportionately on women. 
 263. Id.
 264. Koji Okuda, Japan’s Female Employment Tops 50% for 1st Time in Half-Century,
NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (Feb. 2, 2019, 06:24 JST), https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/
Japan-s-female-employment-tops-50-for-1st-time-in-half-century.
 265. Katharina Buchholz, Half of Japanese Female Workers Are Not Employed Full-Time,
STATISTA (Mar 6, 2019), https://www.statista.com/chart/17262/number-of-japanese-
women-working-part-time/. 
 266. Kano, Womanomics, supra note 244, at 5. 
 267. Id.
 268. See id. at 6. 
 269. Id. at 2. 
 270. Id. at 2 n.5. 
 271. Id. at 2. 
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Thus, it appears that women are expected to carry single-handedly the 
triple burden of a full-time job, the household, and child and elderly 
care. 
A much-publicized initiative is the target for promoting women in 
leadership positions. The initiative, also known as the “30 by 20,” esti-
mated that by the year 2020, 30 percent of the top management posi-
tions would be occupied by women. It was first proposed in 2003 dur-
ing the Koizumi cabinet and was later “appropriated” as one of Abe's 
main womenomics measures.272 Nevertheless, on September 30, 2014, 
the Labor Policy Council suggested that the target was overly ambitious 
and should be lowered due to a number of problems.273 These include 
the large number of women employed in non-regular employment (53 
percent), insufficient child care facilities, high employment dropout 
rates, and little progress in appointing female leaders to decision-making 
posts (7.5 percent).274 As a consequence, in 2015, the 30 percent target 
was modified to seven percent for middle managerial positions for the 
central government and 15 percent for the private sector.275
The laws and acts discussed above had a rather limited effect in in-
creasing the numbers of female leaders. The explanation may lie in their 
failure to convince both employers and employees of the benefits that 
would result from promoting more women to positions of responsibil-
ity. Corporate employers have been reluctant to take on more female 
leaders due to the reasons discussed above: cultural bias, sexist stereo-
types, and the negative perception of females in positions of responsibil-
ity. It has been pointed out that, "since the late 1980s, the more Japa-
nese policy seems to strive toward gender equality, the more employers' 
implementation of policy has served to differentiate the management of 
male and female employees, even widening the gap between the sex-
es."276
 272. Mizuho Aoki, Japan Drastically Lowers Its Goal for Female Managers in Government 
and Private Sector, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 25, 2015), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2015/12/25/national/japan-drastically-lowers-its-goal-for-female-managers-in-
government-and-private-sector/. 
 273. Josei no Katsuyaku Suishin ni muketa Aratana Hôteki Wakugumi no Kôchiku nit-
suite (Hôkoku) [L. POL’Y COUNCIL, REPORT ON ESTABLISHING A NEW
FRAMEWORK FOR PROMOTING FEMALE PARTICIPATION] (2014), https://www.mhlw.
go.jp/file/04-Houdouhappyou-11902000-Koyoukintoujidoukateikyoku-Koyoukin
touseisakuka/0000059755.pdf.
 274. Id.
 275. Sophia Yan & Junko Ogura, Japan Slashes Target for Women in Senior Positions,
CNN MONEY (Dec. 7, 2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/12/07/news/economy/
japan-women-senior-positions/index.html. 
 276. Macnaughton, supra note 251, at 14. 
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In the absence of gender quotas and coercive measures that would 
ensure a more egalitarian distribution of women in leadership positions, 
corporations continue to use women as a cheap labor force. The present 
laws, regulations, and measures do not propose to solve the conundrum 
of work-life balance which confronts working women in Japan, but in-
stead add to the burdens of household and child care that women tend 
to shoulder alone. 
With respect to compliance with the laws and regulations, Table 3 
indicates that the proportion of women in decision-making positions in 
the public and private sectors in 2016 and 2017 failed to meet even the 
lowered targets described above. In the national government and private 
sectors, progress has been slow, and it is unlikely that the targets will be 
reached by the projected deadline. 
Table 3: Women in leadership positions - Targets and current figures 
(Source: Matsui, et al., Womenomics 4.0: Time to Walk the Talk).277
FIELD POSITION
PROPORTION 
(2017)
PERCENT
TARGET
(2020)
PERCENT
Politics (Govern-
ment)
Diet Members (House of Repre-
sentatives) 10.1 30 
Diet Members (House of Counci-
lors) 20.7 30
Prefectural governors 6.4
Prefectural civil service directors 10.4 15
Economic Field 
Employees in positions equivalent 
to section chief in private corpora-
tions
10.9 15 
Employees in positions equivalent 
to department manager in private 
corporations 
6.3 10
Board directors in listed company 4.1 10
Media Journalists (Japan Newspaper Pub-lishers & Editors Association) 
20.2
Education/Research 
President, vice-president and Pro-
fessor at university 16.7 20 
Researchers 16.2
Other Professions 
Doctors 21.1  
Certified public accountants 15
 277. Matsui et al., supra note 133, at 21.  
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Furthermore, a Teikoku Databank survey conducted in April 2018 
among 1.2 million private, non-profit, and public companies to deter-
mine the ratio of women in top managerial positions, reveals that access-
ing leadership positions continues to be a serious challenge for women 
in major companies dominated by males.278 Women were found to fare 
better in medium- to small-sized companies, especially in those in tradi-
tionally “female” sectors, such as child care, beauty care, and educa-
tion.279 The findings suggest that: 
1. The ratio of female CEOs has been growing slowly over the 
past 30 years. Thus, at the end of April 2018, 7.8 percent of 
companies were led by a female CEO compared to 4.2 percent 
in 1998; 
2. Unlike male CEOs, most of whom are appointed by promo-
tion or transfer, many of the female presidents inherited their 
position;
3. The proportion of female CEOs was highest for small enter-
prises with sales of under JPY 50 million (USD 463,000) (10.8 
percent), but smaller for mid- to large-size companies; 
4. The child care business has the highest ratio of female CEOs 
(43.2 percent) followed by beauty care and education; 
5. According to prefecture, the highest ratios of female CEOs 
were found in Aomori (10.6 percent), Okinawa (10.41 per-
cent), Tokushima (10.39 percent), and Saga (10 percent).280
As these data indicate, over three decades since the promulgation of 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Law, and five years into Abenom-
ics, Japanese women have not yet been able to shine in leadership posi-
tions as much as Japanese Prime Minister Abe promised in 2014. 
Moreover, it should be noted that many private companies have 
managed to exploit the loopholes in the EEOL to their advantage with-
out incurring penalties.281 Dr. Emma Dalton criticizes the law as being a 
“toothless” compromise between employers and government, which 
contained no punitive measures against those who violated the law.282
 278. Teikoku Data Bank, Josei Shachô Hiritsu Chôsa [Special Project: Female President 
Ratio Survey] (2018), https://www.tdb.co.jp/report/watching/press/pdf/p180504
.pdf. 
 279. Id. at 4.  
 280. Id.
 281. Assmann, supra note 246, at 7–8.  
 282. EMMA DALTON, WOMEN AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 35 (2015).
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Others call the law a “paper tiger,” as it only stipulates mediation proce-
dures to cope with disputes.283
The EEOL seems to function more as a set of guidelines rather 
than as an enforced policy. The EEOL effectively gave women a false 
sense of individual choice and equal competition, deterred many women 
from re-entering the workforce, and led to a polarization of working 
women into elite and non-elite career tracks.284 One reason is that the 
law, in its 1985 form, was said to be “weak and ambiguous,” urging 
employers to “endeavor to provide women opportunities equal to those 
given men in the areas of recruitment, hiring, job assignment and pro-
motion.”285 As a result, many employers who opposed the 1985 law 
chose to “comply” by introducing a dual track system, comprised of a 
career or managerial track (sôgôshoku), which provided training oppor-
tunities, higher salary and promotion, and a clerical track (ippanshoku), 
which offered none of these benefits.286 Women were generally em-
ployed in clerical jobs.287 Professor Eunmi Mun considers this dual sys-
tem, which further contributed to formalizing sex segregation, an exam-
ple of “negative compliance,”288 where companies “chang[e] their 
internal structure in such a way to make it impossible to violate the 
law.”289 Her research suggests that one of the reasons gender discrimina-
tion has endured even after several revisions of the EEOL is that Japa-
nese companies have constantly sought to circumvent the law by exter-
nalizing female labor.290
 283. Takashi Araki, Recent Legislative Developments in Equal Employment and Harmoniza-
tion of Work and Family Life in Japan, 37 JAPAN LAB. BULL., at 11 (April 1998), 
https://www.jil.go.jp/english/archives/bulletin/documents/199804.pdf. 
 284. ANNE STEFANIE ARONSSON, CAREER WOMEN IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: PURSUING 
IDENTITIES, FASHIONING LIVES 9 (Routledge 2015) (discussing Chizuko Ueno, THE 
MODERN FAMILY IN JAPAN: ITS RISE AND FALL (2009)). 
 285.  Eunmi Mun, Why the Equal Employment Opportunity Law Failed in Japan, AM.
SOC. ASS’N: WORK IN PROGRESS (Aug 10, 2016), https://workinprogress.oowsection
.org/2016/08/10/why-the-equal-employment-opportunity-law-failed-in-japan/. 
 286. Id.
 287. Id.
 288. Eunmi Mun, Negative Compliance as an Organizational Response to Legal Pressures: 
The Case of Japanese Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 94 SOC. FORCES 1409,
1409 (June 2016). 
 289. Mun, Why, supra note 285. 
 290. Mun, Negative Compliance, supra note 288, at 1430–31. Dr. Mun defines the con-
cept of “externalization” as “changing the internal environment to eliminate sources 
of conflict,” which in this case, refers to the introduction of the dual track manage-
ment system that appeared to comply with the EEOL but allowed gender discrimina-
tion. Id. at 1414–15. 
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Feminist author Kaoru Yamamoto provides an interesting account 
of Japanese culture and its relationship with law, explaining that Japa-
nese equate law with the idea of state-imposed constraint.291 She argues 
that Japanese “obey or disobey a law on the basis of the extent to which 
it accords with the facts of human existence.”292 She predicted in 1986 
that, like many other laws of foreign inspiration, the EEOL was not 
likely to become an immediately effective legal tool against sexual dis-
crimination because it was “not in accordance with the realities of socie-
ty.”293 She relayed the opinions of a group of major employers, whose 
stance was, at that time, “government cannot legislate away mores and 
customs that are ingrained in the culture.”294 Nonetheless, although 
painstakingly slow, some progress has been achieved. A 2019 Goldman 
Sachs report (Report) reveals that most of the non-leadership-related 
womenomics policy goals advanced by Prime Minister Abe have been 
attained.295 Among these are: a record female participation in the work-
force of 71 percent, which surpasses the U.S. (66.1 percent) and the Eu-
ro Zone (62.2 percent), generous parental leave benefits, better gender 
transparency, and labor reforms.296 Although 56 percent of women are 
involved in part-time employment, the authors of the Report hypothe-
size that an increase of the ratio of full-time female employment would 
have a greater impact on the Japanese economy.297 Nevertheless, the 
dearth of female leaders remains an area for improvement. The Report 
advocates for an increase of women in decision-making positions, point-
ing to the positive correlation between diverse leadership and corporate 
performance.298 Yet, the ratio of female managers (kacho and above) at 
listed companies is around 14 percent and only 5 percent occupy posi-
tions on company boards.299
Japanese policymakers claim to be committed to closing the gender 
gap and ensuring equal participation of women in business, administra-
tive, and professional fields. Starting with former Prime Minister 
Jun'ichirô Koizumi who, at the beginning of the 2000s, advocated for 
 291. Yamamoto Kaoru, Japan’s New Equal Employment Opportunity Law: Real Weapon or 
Heirloom Sword?, 1986 BYU L. REV. 865, 866 (1986). 
 292. Id. at 867. 
 293. Id. at 868, 882. 
 294. Id. at 883 (quoting Susan Chira, A Tough Ascent for Japanese Women, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 1985, at F1). 
 295. See Matsui et al., supra note 133. 
 296. Id. at 1, 8. 
 297. Id. at 9. 
 298. Id. at 11. 
 299. Id. at 13–14. 
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the merits of women in the workforce,300 and culminating with Prime 
Minister Shinzô Abe who made womenomics the centerpiece of his 
structural reform program known as Abenomics,301 it would appear that, 
at long last, women are given the credit they deserve. Ayako Kano, how-
ever, notes that skeptics are failing to jump on the bandwagon of the 
hype surrounding Prime Minister Abe's womenomics.302 Considering 
that Prime Minister Abe and the ruling party have a history of criticiz-
ing gender equality initiatives as “detrimental to ‘traditional’ cultural 
values”303 and as disastrous for birth rates, feminists are skeptical and 
denounce them as serving the interests of the government and business-
es by continuing to keep most women in low-wage, insecure jobs.304
Feminist scholar Mari Ôsawa argues that the general interest and enthu-
siasm for gender equality is motivated by the argument that it “is good 
for business.”305 Women have yet to see substantial progress with regard 
to full time employment, the wage gap, work-life balance, and child 
care. Despite some progress, it appears that Japan has a long and bumpy 
road ahead.
III. Suggestions for Improving the Pathways for Women to 
Obtain Positions of Leadership in Business 
Not surprisingly, there is no one-size-fits-all solution for eradicat-
ing the glass ceiling for women in business. Yet, each jurisdiction dis-
cussed herein may find some guidance from the other jurisdictions, stay-
ing attuned to the limitations inherent in its respective laws, regulations, 
and culture. This Section offers some suggestions for improving the rep-
resentation of women in the upper echelons of leadership. 
 300. See Yuko Nakano, Japan Chair Platform: Among Equals? Women in Japanese Politics,
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD.: NEWSL. (July 11, 2013), https://www.csis.org/
analysis/japan-chair-platform-among-equals-women-japanese-politics.
 301. William Pesek, Japan’s Womenomics Finally Gets a Face, NIKKEI ASIAN REV., (Aug.
21, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-s-womenomics-finally-
gets-a-face.
 302. Kano, Backlash, supra note 111, at 53. 
 303. Id. at 52-53. 
 304. See id. at 50. 
 305. Mari Ôsawa, Government Approaches to Gender Equality in the Mid-1990s, 3 SOC.
SCI. JAPAN J. 3, 4 (2000). 
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A. The United States 
In the United States, serious reform may need to come from the 
private sector. Fortunately, there are some private initiatives underway, 
although they often focus on specific industries rather than the economy 
as a whole.306 Organizations aiming to promote gender diversity in or-
ganizational leadership exist in law enforcement,307 organized labor,308
finance,309 and medicine,310 among others. Some general organizations 
also exist, such as the Women’s Leadership Council, to provide re-
sources for women seeking and holding positions in local government.311
Some American universities have also promoted female corporate leader-
ship. For example, Yale,312 UCLA,313 and Carnegie Mellon314 offer edu-
cational programs designed specifically to help women advance and suc-
ceed in positions of corporate leadership. Others, such as Rutgers,315
have set up more general research institutions to study the issue.316 In 
many cases, these institutes and programs are fairly new, likely because 
the issue of gender in corporate leadership has only recently come to 
prominence.317
 306. See, e.g., Gender Diversity Index, supra note 1 (aiming to increase the percentage of 
women on U.S. company boards to 20 percent or greater by 2020).
 307. See, e.g., Women’s Leadership Institute, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE,
http://www.theiacp.org/wli.
 308. See, e.g., Barbara Esuoso, New Initiative Takes on Fight for Women’s Leadership in the 
Labor Movement, AM. PROSPECT MAG.: TAPPED: THE PROGRESS GRP. BLOG (Ju-
ly 6, 2017), http://prospect.org/blog/tapped/new-initiative-takes-fight-women
%E2%80%99s-leadership-labor-movement. 
 309. See, e.g., FIN. WOMEN’S ASS’N, https://fwa.org/. 
 310. See, e.g., AMERICAN MED. WOMEN’S ASS’N, https://www.amwa-doc.org/. 
 311. See, e.g., WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.womensleadership
council.org/.
 312. Women’s Leadership Program, YALE SCH. OF MGMT., https://som.yale.edu/
programs/executive-education/for-individuals/leadership/womens-leadership-
program.
 313. Women’s Leadership Institute, UCLA ANDERSON SCH. OF MGMT.,
http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/executive-education/individual-executives/womens-
leadership-institute. 
 314. Leadership for Women Executive Education Programs, TEPPER SCH. OF BUS., CARNEGIE
MELLON U., https://www.cmu.edu/tepper/executive-education/women/index.html.
 315. Institute for Women’s Leadership, RUTGERS U., https://iwl.rutgers.edu/. 
 316. The institute at Rutgers University, for example, states that it is “dedicated to the 
study of women and gender, to advocacy on behalf of gender equity, and to the pro-
motion of women’s leadership locally, nationally and globally.” Our Mission: Advanc-
ing Women’s Leadership for a Just World, RUTGERS U. INST. FOR WOMEN’S
LEADERSHIP, https://iwl.rutgers.edu/. 
 317. See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., FULFILLING THE PROMISE: HOW MORE WOMEN ON 
CORPORATE BOARDS WOULD MAKE AMERICA AND AMERICAN COMPANIES MORE 
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As corporate gender diversity has gained more attention in both the 
popular and academic press, philanthropic organizations have also 
moved to boost female representation in American corporate leadership. 
The Rockefeller Foundation announced its “100x25” commitment in 
2016,318 and the Wilson Center founded its Global Women’s Leader-
ship Initiative in 2011.319 Meanwhile, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foun-
dation has led the development of female leadership programs in various 
fields including education,320 and specifically targets female-led startups 
for investment through its programs.321 As with university initiatives, 
most of these programs have been established in the last several decades, 
and many only within the last ten years.322
Case studies of female leadership programs in specific organizations 
have garnered significant attention in the academic literature. One 
study, examining the Women in Medicine and Health Science 
(WIMHS) program at the California Davis School of Medicine found 
COMPETITIVE 5 (2012), https://www.fwa.org/pdf/CED_WomenAdvancementon
CorporateBoards.pdf (“Successive crises touching the performance of American cor-
porations have focused increased attention on the board of directors as a unique insti-
tution with power to effect change. Those scrutinizing corporate boards see an obvi-
ous feature: They are predominately composed of men. In 2011, women occupied 
just 16 percent of Fortune 500 board seats. That percentage is far below the percent-
age of women in the labor force, enrolled in higher education, and graduating with 
advanced degrees.”); Kweilin Ellingrud, How Women Leaders Change Company Dy-
namics, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2019, 12:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/kweilinellingrud/2019/01/30/how-women-leaders-change-company-dynamics/
#1291f0f34733 (“Would more women in corporate leadership roles – CEOs, presi-
dents, SVPs, managers- make companies more successful and change the culture in 
the workplace? These are valid questions after new data outlines the depth of gender 
inequality throughout C-Suites and senior management positions in companies 
throughout North America.”). 
 318. The Rockefeller Foundation Launches “100x25” Campaign to Reach 100 Women CEOs 
of the Fortune 500 Companies by 2025, THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND. (May 12, 2016), 
https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/about-us/news-media/13274/.
319.   Global Women’s Leadership Initiative: About, WILSON CTR., https://www.wilsoncenter
.org/about-gwli (“The Global Women’s Leadership Initiative at the Wilson Center is 
a unique platform for promoting enduring balance in leadership roles – equipping 
women with the skills and tools they need to lead, helping to build lasting mentor-
ships between current and emerging leaders, raising the profile of critical issues across 
all sectors and advancing inclusive policies and research.”). 
 320. AASA Women in School Leadership Initiative: About, THE SCH. SUPERINTENDENTS 
ASS’N, http://www.aasa.org/WomenInSchoolLeadership.aspx.
 321. Polina Marinova, Why Melinda Gates Has Been Funding Female VCs Through Her 
Secretive Investment Firm, FORTUNE (May 30, 2018), http://fortune.com/
2018/05/30/melinda-gates-limited-partner-venture-capital/. 
 322. E.g. THE ROCKEFELLER FOUND., supra note 318 (“100x25” founded in 2016); 
WILSON CTR., supra note 319 (Global Women’s Leadership Initiative founded in 
2011,); Marinova, supra note 321 (launched in 2015). 
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that the program’s initiatives led to a “steady increase in the number and 
percentage of women faculty and department chairs, as well as a relative-
ly low departure rate for female faculty.”323 The program included a 
comprehensive set of initiatives, involving a variety of networking 
events, mentorship and leadership clinics, sessions on public speaking 
and salary negotiation, and supporting the work-life balance of partici-
pating individuals.324 In the ten years following the establishment of the 
program, the percentage of female faculty members increased from be-
low 20 percent to around 40 percent, with the proportion of female de-
partment heads also rising from fewer than 5 percent to nearly 25 per-
cent,325 although the authors state that they “cannot determine whether 
the increase in the number of female faculty over time is directly related 
to the WIMHS program.”326
In 2009, a case study was conducted on a large engineering firm’s 
Women’s Leadership Initiative, which included mentoring and net-
working programs along with targeted recruiting and “a formal succes-
sion planning process that ensures slates are diverse and include at least 
one woman or person of color.”327 This study showed that between the 
Initiative’s founding in 2003 and the time of the study, the proportion 
of female directors increased from 23 percent to 31 percent, executives 
from three percent to 18 percent, and project managers from 20 percent 
to 30 percent.328 This led to the firm being the first in its industry to 
earn a Catalyst Award for supporting women in business.329
Broader gender equality movements have often pushed work-life 
balance initiatives to reduce the gender pay gap330 and to promote wom-
en’s advancement at work.331 Work-life initiatives may also contribute to 
gender equality in leadership. One study posited a general relationship 
between aspiration to leadership and work-life balance initiatives and 
 323. Melissa D. Bauman, Lydia P. Howell & Amparo C. Villablanca, The Women in Med-
icine and Health Science Program: An Innovative Initiative to Support Female Faculty at 
the University of California Davis School of Medicine, 89 ACAD. MED. 1461, 1461 
(2014).
 324. Id. at 1463. 
 325. Id. at 1465. 
 326. Id. at 1464. 
 327. Meg Ibison & Bob Bailey, Women’s Advancement: One Engineering Firm’s Pathway to 
Leadership, 101 J. AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N., 44, 46 (2009). 
 328.   Id.
 329. Id. at 50. 
 330. See, e.g., Claudia Goldin, A Grand Gender Convergence: Its Last Chapter, 104 AMER.
ECON. REV. 1091 (2014). 
 331. See, e.g., Rebecca Shambaugh, Are Chore Wars at Home Holding You Back at Work?,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 19, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/01/are-chore-wars-at-home-
holding-you-back-at-work. 
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found that “because the work-life interface poses greater challenges for 
women,” “women’s leadership aspiration is more influenced by work-
life initiatives,”332 although both men and women ultimately benefit-
ed.333 These studies illustrate that implementation of mentoring and 
networking programs as well as family-friendly policies should help 
more women rise to the upper levels in organizations and to become 
prepared to serve on boards. 
In addition, a number of major institutional American investors 
have begun considering the issue; State Street, BlackRock, and Van-
guard have all announced their support for a range of shareholder pro-
posals on gender diversity.334 The findings of the national campaign 
2020 Women on Boards reveal that “the average number of corporate 
board seats held by women on the 2018 Russell 3000 Index has risen to 
17.7 percent, up from 16.0 percent, in 2017, but that the “majority of 
new, mid-cap and small cap companies continue to go public with just 
one or no women on their boards.”335
Finally, in previous work, Professors Dworkin and Schipani have 
advocated mentoring and networking as important pathways for women 
to rise to positions of corporate leadership.336 Furthermore, although 
gender quotas are unlikely to be legal in the U.S. any time in the near 
 332. Claudia Fritz & Daan van Knippenberg, Gender and Leadership Aspiration: The Im-
pact of Work-Life Initiatives, 57 HUM. RES. MGMT. 855, 855 (2017). 
 333. Id.
 334. Castro, supra note 18. 
 335. Gender Diversity Index, supra note 1, at 2. 
 336. Mentoring and networking are shown to be critical to the professional development 
that leads to career advancement. A mentor offers the vital guidance, support, and 
opportunity to a protégé that allows the protégé to enhance her skills, problem-solve, 
and access greater opportunities. See generally Terry Morehead Dworkin & Cindy A. 
Schipani, The Role of Gender Diversity in Corporate Governance, 21 PA. J. OF BUS. L.
105 (2018); Terry Morehead Dworkin, Cindy A. Schipani, Frances J. Milliken & 
Madeline K. Kneeland, Assessing the Progress of Women in Corporate Governance: The 
More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same, 55 AM. BUS. L. J. 721 (2018); Ter-
ry Morehead Dworkin, Aarti Ramaswami & Cindy A. Schipani, A Half Century Post-
Title VII: Still Seeking Pathways for Women to Organizational Leadership, 23 UCLA
WOMEN’S L. J. 29, 72-75 (2016); Terry Morehead Dworkin, Aarti Ramaswami & 
Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of Networks, Mentors, and the Law in Overcoming Barri-
ers to Organizational Leadership for Women with Children, 20 MICH. J. OF GENDER &
LAW 83, 118-19 (2013); Cindy A. Schipani, Terry Morehead Dworkin, Angel 
Kwolek-Folland & Virginia Maurer, Pathways for Women to Obtain Positions of Or-
ganizational Leadership: The Significance of Mentoring and Networking, DUKE J. OF 
GENDER L. & POLICY 89, 135-36 (2009); Cindy A. Schipani, Terry Morehead 
Dworkin, Angel Kwolek-Folland, Virginia Maurer & Marina V. N. Whitman, Wom-
en and the New Corporate Governance and Pathways for Women to Obtain Positions of 
Organizational Leadership, 56 MD. L. REV. 504, 536 (2006).  
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future, private firms should make sincere efforts to mentor and promote 
qualified women, paying close attention to implicit and unconscious bi-
ases that may be in play in their training and selection processes. 
B. The European Union 
We concur with the European Commission in that “not taking ad-
vantage of the skills of highly qualified women constitutes a waste of tal-
ent and a loss of economic growth potential.”337 Though the European 
Commission encouraged credible self-regulation by companies to im-
prove gender balance on corporate boards, the proportion of women, as 
shown in our analysis of the EURO STOXX companies, remains low. 
We consider the introduction of a gender quota a necessary instrument 
to implement change. Moreover, “the figures show that it is the legisla-
tive measures that result in substantial progress, especially if they are ac-
companied by sanctions.”338 In addition, it is important to raise aware-
ness that “empowering women means a more efficient use of a nation’s 
human capital endowment and that reducing gender inequality enhanc-
es productivity and economic growth.”339
The E.U. promotes gender mainstreaming in order to increase 
gender equality and to combat discrimination. At the same time it is 
worth looking at the causes of female underrepresentation in different 
areas of activity. The European Commission’s Special Eurobarometer 
465 Gender Equality 2017 report offers an interesting picture on the 
opinions and perceptions of E.U. citizens on gender. For instance, 44 
percent of respondents believe the most important role of a women is to 
take care of her home and family and 43 percent think the most im-
portant role of a man is to earn money.340 At the same time 87 percent 
believe gender equality to be important for companies and for the econ-
omy.341 Therefore policy makers should ask how these attitudes can be 
united in meaningful gender equality measures. It is also worth ques-
tioning how much can be changed in a top-down manner, versus in a 
down-top manner. A gender quota could be a solution, but without a 
 337. V?RA JOUROVÁ, EUR. COMM’N, GENDER BALANCE ON CORPORATE BOARDS:
EUROPE IS BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING 1 (2016). 
 338. EUR. COMM’N, WOMEN IN ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING IN THE EU: PROGRESS 
REPORT 13 (2012). 
 339. WORLD ECON. F., THE GLOBAL GENDER GAP REPORT 2015 36 (2015), http://
www3.weforum.org/docs/GGGR2015/cover.pdf.
 340. EUR. COMM’N, SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER 465 GENDER EQUALITY 2017, 4 (2017). 
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thorough change of the opinions (gender stereotypes included) and val-
ues of the E.U. citizens, any progress will be slow and may be superfi-
cial.
C. Japan 
Judging by the lack of substantial progress, one can infer that pub-
lic initiatives have failed to persuade companies of the benefits of pro-
moting women in leadership positions in Japan. The so-called 
“Eruboshi” certification system,342 based on the Act of Promotion of 
Women's Participation and Advancement in the Workplace, is a meas-
ure that appears to have failed in its initial purpose and was instead used 
as a public relations instrument. Thus, according to a survey conducted 
by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare in 2018, the Eruboshi 
certification is perceived more as a means to upgrade a company's image 
and attract more prospective employees and less as a recognition of fe-
male leaders' contribution to the prosperity of the company.343
On the other hand, among the private initiatives that aim at nur-
turing and promoting female leadership participation, two notable en-
deavors should be mentioned. First, the Japanese Women's Leadership 
Initiative, founded in 2006 in Boston, provides hands-on experience 
and training in nonprofit management and leadership development.344
The second initiative, TOMODACHI MetLife Women's Leadership 
Program, is a Japanese-American public-private partnership started in 
Tokyo and Kansai in 2013 and expanded to other major cities (Sappo-
ro, Fukuoka, Naha) in 2014. It seeks to nurture future generations of 
female leaders through leadership development training and mentoring 
with mid-career professional women.345 The declared goal of these initia-
tives is to inculcate young Japanese women with leadership qualities and 
 342. Eruboshi (in English “L-star”) certification is a three-tiered accreditation system 
which acknowledges the efforts of private corporations to actively promote women in 
leadership and managerial positions. 
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educate them on the benefits of increased female agency on Japanese so-
ciety.
In the past, women would work full-time from high school or col-
lege graduation up until age 25, when they dropped out of employment 
to have children, and re-entered the workforce around the age of 40, 
when their children were grown. As Figure 7 shows, in recent years, 
more women are continuing to work well into their thirties or forties, 
trying to balance work and family, or even shunning marriage or 
childbearing. The tendency is particularly notable through 2014-2016, 
which coincides with the debut of Prime Minister Abe's womenomics 
and the concerted efforts toward increasing the female workforce. 
Figure 7: Women's labor force participation by age group (Source: Bureau of 
Lab. Statistics).346
The increase in the number of women who continue to work well 
into their thirties is not just a sign of emancipation, but is interpreted by 
some as a sign of increasing precarity. Professor Kumiko Nemoto sees in 
Japanese women's apparent rejection of marriage and childbirth a sign 
of increased gender inequality.347 And Professor Chelsea Szendi Scheider 
points to the recent tendency of replacing full-time workers with con-
tract or temporary workers as a form of “feminization of poverty,” given 
that women who work in temporary, contract, or irregular jobs (as of 
 346. Women’s Labour Force Participation by Age Group, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. img.51 
(2017), https://www.gov-online.go.jp/eng/publicity/book/hlj/html/201712/img/
img_01_51.png.
 347. Kumiko Nemoto, Postponed Marriage: Exploring Women’s View of Matrimony and 
Work in Japan, 22 GENDER & SOC’Y 219, 234 – 35 (2008). 
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2018, 56 percent of women aged 20 to 65)348 are most at risk of becom-
ing unemployed.349 She notes that, while Abe’s “womenomics” is likely 
to benefit a select group of women and companies, it does little to im-
prove the situation of working women at the lower end of the employ-
ment scale, who “never get far enough up to glimpse the glass ceiling.”350
Ayako Kano shares this view and suggests that neoliberal measures pro-
duce winners and losers and that, given the pervasiveness of misogyny 
and sexism at all levels, signs that a group of elite women will manage to 
break through the glass ceiling are scarce.351
Scholar Helen Macnaughtan sees a solution in changing political, 
corporate, and social mentalities toward acknowledging the needs and 
aspirations of both women and men.352 A shift from the model of the 
man as the sole breadwinner to one that supports dual-income families, 
making parental leave mandatory for working fathers, and providing 
sufficient child care facilities would ease women's much-needed return 
to the workforce. In addition, encouraging highly educated women into 
career-track jobs, employment legislation regarding recruitment and 
child care, as well as rigorous gender-balanced targets for recruitment 
are just a few of the policies that can be implemented to help tap into 
the latent potential of women.353 However, as the current situation 
shows, these policies cannot succeed in the absence of fundamental re-
forms at the level of organizational culture. 
Kathy Matsui and colleagues recommend that not only the gov-
ernment but also corporations and society at large become more in-
volved in making changes “without delay” regarding the current status 
of women in the workforce.354 They advise that the government offer 
more flexible labor contracts instead of the existing regular and non-
regular ones, which offer little incentive for women to return to regular 
employment after childbirth.355 Moreover, they recommend gender pay 
gap disclosures, rectification of breadwinner tax disincentives, introduc-
tion of parliamentary gender quotas, and more robust measures of pro-
moting female entrepreneurship, such as offering preferential treatment 
to female-owned businesses for government procurement, easing wom-
 348. Matsui et al., Womenomics 5.0, supra note 134. 
 349. See Chelsea Szendi Shieder, Womenomics vs. Women: Neoliberal Cooptation of Femi-
nism in Japan, 3 MEIJI J. OF POL. SCI. & ECON. 53, 58 (2014). 
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en’s access to credit and low-interest loans, as well as mentorship and 
networking programs.356 In addition, they stress the necessity of tighten-
ing gender diversity disclosure requirements, which at present is not 
standardized and is difficult to compare across industries or compa-
nies.357 Companies should prioritize gender diversity in recruiting, reten-
tion and promotion, promote more flexible working environments, shift 
the promotion system from the current seniority-based system to a per-
formance-based system, set gender diversity targets, and engage male 
leaders in initiatives to promote gender diversity.358
Furthermore, a departure from rigid hierarchy toward encouraging 
a more flexible model of work-life balance and prioritizing efficiency 
over long working hours would be beneficial not only for women, but 
also for men, who—if given the chance—may wish to work different-
ly.359 Effective changes call for men's cooperation in equally sharing 
household chores and child care.360 Although only three percent of Japa-
nese men took paternity leave in 2017, a positive change has been seen 
among younger men.361 Japanese millennials' attitudes have started to 
turn, as more men are encouraged to spend time with their families.362
The Work-Style Reform Bill, enacted in June 2018, seeks to address the 
issues of overtime work and quality of life by introducing legal caps on 
overtime hours.363 The Premium Friday initiative, adopted in February 
2017, encourages companies to allow their workers to leave work at 
3:00 pm on the last Friday of the month.364 For true change to take ef-
fect, however, Japanese companies should abandon the practice of pro-
tecting their core of life-long employed male workers and of slotting 
women into temporary, dead-end jobs. Abolition of sexual, maternity, 
or power-related harassment is another necessary condition for a more 
open and transparent atmosphere in the workplace, and one more con-
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ducive to mutual respect and cooperation. As Macnaughtan concludes, 
“Womenomics will not make any real impact if it cannot challenge or 
inspire women and men to give up the status quo or indeed challenge 
the increasingly precarious modes of livelihood for both women and 
men.”365
Compared to the U.S. and the E.U., Japan still has a long way to 
go in raising awareness of the benefits of having more women on corpo-
rate boards, and in nurturing leadership capabilities in young women 
with the aim of building a network of women in executive and man-
agement roles. It is necessary that universities, public and private organi-
zations, as well as media outlets be proactive in changing the societal 
perceptions about gender roles and housework sharing.366
Conclusion 
This examination of three of the most developed economies illus-
trates that development does not equate to equal opportunity and ad-
vancement for women in business. Although Japan, the European Un-
ion, and the United States have all seen progress regarding advancement 
of women in employment, that progress has been slow and often diffi-
cult. At present, women in the E.U. seem to be faring best. 
Women working in the E.U. appear to be in a better position both 
in terms of the number of women in leadership positions and the diver-
sity of industry and types of companies where they work. This can be 
attributed to the legally mandated or recommended quotas for women 
in supervisory boards and management. Quotas, however, are not legal-
ly feasible in the United States. 
Progress for United States women in leadership positions and as 
corporate board members has mainly occurred through social pressure 
and the rising economic and political power of women. Unfortunately, 
there is a tendency toward segregation. Women in management and on 
boards tend to be concentrated in “female-specialized” areas. 
Japan has seen the least progress toward equality. Whether women 
venture out of the similar occupational ghettos or stay within them, 
corporations have created insidious dual track career opportunities—
managerial versus clerical—which even further contribute to formalizing 
gender segregation. Japan has no legislated quota system and even meet-
ing the state-recommended percentage of women on corporate boards 
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lags far behind the goals. Additionally, there is an insufficient pool of 
working women to meet them and a low number of women aspiring to 
leadership due to the traditional gender role distribution. 
Top-down measures and targets cannot resolve these issues with-
out more understanding and acceptance of career women in all walks of 
life. Pressure to change will likely come from the necessity to utilize 
women's latent potential to further economic development. The more 
interaction between women on boards and in management with men in 
similar positions, the more women will be seen for their capabilities and 
contributions. It is also important to create an environment to bolster 
women's career ambitions and aspirations. A powerful way to create this 
environment is to provide a mentoring system and significant role mod-
els. Another is adopting family-friendly policies such as those in the Eu-
ropean Union. These are more likely to happen as more organizations 
and leaders recognize the economic benefits that result from women on 
boards and in leadership positions. This, in turn, will contribute to 
equality and fairness.  
